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Abstract 
This is the second article in a four-article series that ex-
amines Buddhist responses to the Western philosophical 
problem of whether free will is compatible with “deter-
minism,” the doctrine of universal causation. The first ar-
ticle focused on the first publications on this issue in the 
1970s, the “early period”; the present article and the next 
examine key responses published in the last part of the 
Twentieth century and first part of the Twenty-first, the 
“middle period”; and the fourth article will examine re-
sponses published in the last few years. Whereas early-
period scholars endorsed compatibilism, in the middle pe-
riod the pendulum moved the other way: Mark Siderits 
argued for a Buddhist version of partial incompatibilism, 
semi-compatibilism, or “paleo-compatibilism,” and 
Charles Goodman argued for a straightforward Buddhist 
hard determinism. The present article focuses on Sider-
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its’s paleo-compatibilism; the subsequent article focuses 
on Goodman’s hard determinism. 
 
Conclusions of the Early-Period Scholarship2 
In the first article in this series (“Earlier”) I examined the writings of ear-
ly-period Buddhist scholars Story, Rāhula, Gómez, and Kalupahana re-
garding the Western philosophical problem of whether free will is com-
patible with “determinism,” the doctrine of universal lawful causation. 
These “early-period” scholars resist a straightforward equation of the 
Buddhist doctrine of dependent origination (pratītya samutpāda), which 
asserts the dependence of all conditioned/composite phenomena on 
previous or simultaneous impartite micro-phenomena, with either a 
“rigid” determinism or a “chaotic” indeterminism, opting for a “middle 
way” between both. Some hold that Hume’s model of causation, as mere 
constant conjunction obtaining among pairs of contingent event types, 
provides a “middle way” for Buddhist compatibilism.3 But Humean cau-
sation involves generalizations about contingent event pairings; deter-
minism involves necessary ones. Thus, determinism cannot be Humean; 
and if dependent origination is Humean, it is not deterministic. The Bud-
dhist reply to the free will problem would then be simple: determinism is 
false. However, that undermines the idea that dependent origination is 
causation, rather than an error theory about it (like Hume’s projectivist 
account). The problem is that causation arguably does too much substan-
tive work in Buddhism to be amenable to a simple error theory.  
 Early-period scholars seem not to have noticed another middle-
path option: soft determinism. “Hard determinists” hold that determin-
                                                             
2 I would like to thank Dan Cozort, Mark Siderits, Claire Gaynor, and an anonymous re-
viewer at the Journal of Buddhist Ethics for comments to the present article. 
3 Siderits also suggests this Humean model in Persons. 
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ism is true, entails an invariable series of events, and thus whatever 
happens cannot have been otherwise, so we lack free will. “Soft deter-
minists” reject only the conclusion (“so we lack free will”), for various 
reasons, because, for example, knowledge of cause and effect renders 
undesirable events evitable.4 The Buddha emphasizes that knowledge of 
cause and effect (between beliefs, volitions, actions, and consequences) 
and the cultivation of mindfulness of beliefs, volitions, and actions are 
the basic means to liberation and the end of suffering. Thus, if depend-
ent origination is deterministic, the form endorsed by the Buddha would 
arguably be soft determinism.  
Early-period scholarship addresses, but leaves unresolved, the 
Buddhist nonacceptance of the self, which raises the question of how a 
nonagent could be autonomous. Middle-period scholars, however, ad-
dress this question directly. Goodman rests his argument against free 
will on the claim that because Buddhism rejects the self it rejects any 
responsible agent. A related issue, unexplored in early-period scholar-
ship but taken up by Siderits, is mereological (part/whole) reductionism, 
the idea that all conditioned phenomena that appear to be substantive 
wholes do not ultimately exist as such, that is, as anything beyond their 
aggregated parts. The issues are related because if the self is no more 
than an aggregation of psychophysical events/processes, it is unreal; 
hence, if free will rests on an unreal entity, free will is unreal. Whereas 
                                                             
4 Fatalists believe that if a certain event is fated, no antecedent interference can pre-
vent it. Local fatalists think certain events are fated; global fatalists think all events are. 
Whereas fatalism is acausal, determinism is causal: every event is necessitated by causal 
laws. Global fatalists and determinists agree on a single, invariable, necessary series of 
events, but for acausal and causal reasons, respectively. Most hard and soft determin-
ists agree that the invariable series runs through causally effective choices, but disa-
gree about whether agent-proximal activities (such as belief, volition, choice, and ac-
tion) are sufficiently “up to” the agent to count as responsible agency, although elimi-
nativist hard determinists doubt mental states have any causal powers; see Caruso (Illu-
sion). Some soft determinists assert that, had prior contingent conditions (volitions, 
say) been otherwise, the agent could have done otherwise; hard determinists insist that 
conditions are never otherwise, thus that the alleged ability is otiose. 
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Goodman uses a no-self premise (but not on mereological grounds) in his 
argument against free will, since the 1980s Siderits has been attempting 
an increasingly nuanced articulation of the implications between the 
concepts of free will, determinism, and the self,5 by reference to the the-
ory of “Buddhist Reductionism” that he has extrapolated from the early 
Buddhist doctrine of “two truths” (conventional and ultimate), a bifurca-
tion paralleled in Western philosophy of science. In this article, I will ex-
plore Siderits’s account. Much of the analysis may be applied to Good-
man’s account. 
 
Siderits: Paleo-compatibilism 
Siderits’s training is in both Asian philosophy and Western analytic phi-
losophy, but his scholarly efforts are mostly focused on Buddhism. Par-
ticularly, he has articulated an impressive, highly complex Buddhist ac-
count of the person in his treatise, Personal Identity and Buddhist Philoso-
phy: Empty Persons, some implications of which bear on free will. His ex-
tremely nuanced, well-argued account involves analyses of the relevant 
metaphysical, epistemological, semantic, and ethical features of earlier 
and later Buddhist thought regarding the person, in dialectical exchange 
with all the relevant arguments and trends in current Western analytical 
philosophical thought in these fields (Persons). Its impressive, complex 
theoretical structure provides the framework within which his thinking 
on free will must be situated to be fully grasped. 
 Over three decades Siderits has presented and published several 
papers on free will,6 and his proffered theory has evolved through in-
                                                             
5 Siderits’s work is classified as middle-period work because his first relevant article 
appeared in 1987 and, though his most recent paper presentation was at a 2011 confer-
ence, most of his relevant published work occurs between the early and recent periods. 
6 See Siderits (“Beyond”; “Buddhism”; “Buddhist”; “Reductionism”; “Expressible”; Pan-
el). 
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creasingly polished iterations, through the course of which he has come 
to call it “paleo-compatibilism.” I have struggled to grasp paleo-
compatibilism as it has evolved through its iterations, but upon exami-
nation of his other relevant works, particularly Persons, the richness, 
complexity, and coherence of his model have become abundantly clear, 
any limitations on my own comprehension and objections notwithstand-
ing. Many of the questions and objections I raise in the course of my 
analysis reflect more the stages of my own efforts at understanding than 
any weaknesses of his account. However, raising them and articulating 
what a paleo-compatibilist can say in response ought to reveal the ex-
planatory purchase of that theory, and thus ought to help fill in the de-
tails of its meaning that might not be apparent in his writings that are 
more narrowly focused on free will.  
 It would be misleading to describe paleo-compatibilism as what 
Siderits actually thinks. He has made it clear that paleo-compatibilism is 
just a possible view that he has extrapolated from Ābhidharma (that an 
Ābhidharmika or other sympathetic Buddhist or other philosopher could 
hold),7 a view he believes is worth investigating because it evidences the 
philosophical potential of the Buddhist tradition.8 In this regard, he may 
be described as the philosophical analogue of the amicus curiae, insofar as 
he is a friend of the theory, not its actual advocate—an amicus theoria. For 
                                                             
7 The Ābhidharma (“higher Dharma” or teaching) is the third of three collections of ear-
ly Buddhist texts (Tripiṭaka, “three baskets”), written in Pāli, that constitute the early 
Buddhist Pāli Canon; an Ābhidharmika is a follower of the Ābhidharma. The Ābhidhar-
ma is a philosophical articulation of the doctrines implicit in the other two sets of texts, 
the Sutras (sayings of the Buddha) and the Vinaya (the monastic code). “Dharma” (San-
skrit; Pāli: “Dhamma”) is difficult to translate, and has many differences in meaning 
based on usage, but may mean any of the following, loosely: the way things are, the 
teachings of the Buddha(s), the universal pattern or way, the truth or the path to its 
realization, and so on. 
8 Siderits (Panel). Siderits takes this general posture—of offering Buddhist ideas as 
items of potential interest to Western philosophers, without asserting them himself—
not only in his articles on free will, but in his major monographs, such as Persons and 
Philosophy. His writings on free will, therefore, must be understood within his larger 
curriculum vita, using that phrase in the broadest sense. 
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ease of reference, however, I sometimes say “Siderits thinks” (and the 
like) when referring to the implications or claims a paleo-compatibilist 
makes or would make, but this is to be taken as shorthand for something 
like “Siderits thinks a paleo-compatibilist thinks,” or some such modified 
notion. 
Siderits admits that his view is not necessarily “the” view Bud-
dhists have articulated on the subject, and he has stated that the doc-
trine of Buddhist Reductionism that supports paleo-compatibilism is 
“the view of persons systematically worked out in the Ābhidharma 
schools” (Persons 14). Even in Persons, Siderits does not affirm or assert 
the Ābhidharma Reductionist view, but merely articulates and analyzes 
it, alongside later Buddhist views as well as recent Western analytic 
views, the dialectical progression through which leads Siderits to his 
rich Buddhist account of persons. It is a complex, multistaged view that 
includes elements of both Ābhidharma Reductionism and Mahāyāna an-
tirealism, as well as what he calls “semantic non-dualism,” an enlight-
ened analogue of common-sense realism that synthesizes the insights of 
Reductionism and antirealism, but avoids their pitfalls. Siderits’s analysis 
may be sketched in its progression through four stages. Simplifying 
greatly, these stages are: 
1. Common sense realism: perceptual wholes (chariots, lec-
terns, persons, etc.) are real. 
2. Reductionism: macro-level wholes (conventional reali-
ty’s constituents) are ontologically empty, illusions 
based on aggregations of their more ultimately real 
micro-constituents, which are not empty. Still, there 
are pragmatic reasons for speaking as if conventional 
wholes exist, to the extent that facts at the ultimate 
level ground conventional discourse (semantic dualism). 
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3. Antirealism: even micro-constituents are ontologically 
empty, thus all is unreal. 
4. Semantic nondualism: because everything is empty 
there is no ontological distinction between wholes and 
micro-constituents, so all is equally real/unreal. 
Thus, while paleo-compatibilism extrapolates from the Buddhist 
Reductionism of the Ābhidharma (stage 2), it does not reflect the full 
progression Siderits articulates in Persons, which incorporates Mahāyāna 
antirealism and concludes with semantic nondualism. That paleo-
compatibilism relies on only an early stage in Siderits’s more compre-
hensive account suggests that a more evolved Buddhist position on free 
will may be extracted from that larger account, and that paleo-
compatibilism is, as Siderits suggests, just an illustration of the philo-
sophical potential of Buddhist thought. Siderits has yet to articulate that 
more evolved Buddhist view regarding free will, and though it would be 
interesting to attempt that articulation here, we have enough on our 
plate with paleo-compatibilism. 
Thus, let us explore paleo-compatibilism, first by way of simplifi-
cations, and then by increasingly pulling at its problematic dimensions. 
The main idea in paleo-compatibilism is that the Buddhist bifurcation of 
reality-discourse into ultimate and conventional levels, or “two truths,” 
may be used to resolve the tension between determinism and free will. 
Simplifying, for the Ābhidharmika, ultimate truth may be described as re-
ality as it is independently of conceptual constructions (although it is per-
ceived by the enlightened mind), and conventional truth as whatever we 
normally take reality to be constituted by, relative to our interests.9 This 
view is intimately connected to the mereological reductionism of the 
                                                             
9 Siderits (“Expressible”). In Sanskrit, “satya” (or “sat”) seems sometimes to mean “reali-
ty” instead of “truth.” Although reality and truth differ, truth-statements are converti-
ble into reality-statements, and vice versa. 
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Ābhidharma: partite wholes are ultimately unreal, illusions generated by 
misapprehension or faulty conceptualization of their aggregated, ulti-
mately real impartite parts. To use Siderits’s latest example,10 if only 
quanta constitute ultimate reality, then in our final ontology there are 
no lecterns to be found, but because lecterns have pragmatic purposes 
lecterns are conventionally real even though ultimately unreal. There is 
nothing in a lectern aside from its aggregated quantum constituents, 
though those constituents are ultimately real. Philosophers of science 
might say quanta are “natural kinds,” because they identify mind-
independent (or, on the similar Buddhist distinction, conceptualization-
independent) features of nature (the world as it is) carved at its joints.11  
How does this two truths strategy apply to the free will and de-
terminism issue? Paleo-compatibilism parses dependent origination (pu-
tatively, determinism) as an ultimate-level doctrine that asserts the de-
pendence of all conditioned/composite phenomena on previous or sim-
ultaneous impartite micro-phenomena (like quanta), and free will as a 
conventional-level doctrine that asserts agent-based abilities in the 
pragmatic realm of macro-level objects (like lecterns). The paleo-
compatibilist’s solution is that determinism and free will are both real, 
but treated on different reality-discourse levels, or, in a sense, real in dif-
ferent ways, just as lecterns are pragmatically real and quanta are ulti-
mately real. Because realities are necessarily compatible, there cannot be 
any issue of the incompatibility of free will and determinism, but be-
cause they involve different levels of reality, or universes of discourse, to 
even ask if they are compatible in the usual sense is to conflate discourse 
domains: the question is semantically ill-formed. 
We have, then, an initial understanding of paleo-compatibilism. 
Now, let us begin to problematize this understanding by examining the 
                                                             
10 Siderits (Panel). 
11 See Bird and Tobin (“Kinds”). 
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notion of compatible realities. Consider the notion of counterfactually 
possible worlds, worlds closely resembling the actual/factual world that 
could have been a certain way in one respect, had the actual world been, 
say, slightly different in some other respect. For example, imagine a 
world just like ours in every other respect but which contains a single 
quantum more than our world. Various counterfactual and other possible 
worlds—realities—may be mostly “compatible” with the actual world, but 
any nonidentical worlds, Wx and Wy, necessarily contain facts that cannot 
obtain in both worlds, or else they would be identical, so any conjunction 
of all claims about both worlds will contain at least one contradiction 
reflecting the difference between them. Thus, no nonidentical factual 
and counterfactual full descriptions of reality are fully compatible, 
though they may be relevantly or mostly compatible. Wx and Wy might be 
“compatible” in the sense that Wx contains, say, one extra quantum than 
Wy which makes no significant difference to anything else between them 
(although both physicists and Mahāyāna interdependence theorists 
might dispute the qualifier “significant,” given their shared thesis of the 
interdependence of everything on everything, which implies any differ-
ence anywhere will have implications for everything else everywhere). 
Nonetheless, the conjunction of claims that exhaustively describes noni-
dentical Wx and Wy is inconsistent: it contains at least one contradiction 
(about the number of quanta).12  
Philosophers want to know whether both claims—persons some-
times exhibit free will, and the universe is deterministic—can be simultane-
ously true in the same way claims about the number of quanta (in Wx 
and Wy) cannot: on the same bivalent truth scale. Of course, the world-
qualified claims “the number of quanta in Wx is n-1” and “the number of 
quanta in Wy is n” are compatible, because they are about two different 
                                                             
12 An alternative interpretation that avoids contradiction is to shift from ontology to 
epistemology, asserting two descriptions of one reality, but some interpretations of the 
two truths are pointedly ontological (Cozort and Preston “Buddhist” 54-55). 
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worlds, but the unqualified claims “the number of quanta that exist is n-
1” and “the number of quanta that exist is n” are inconsistent, as these 
claims are not indexed, relativized, or partitioned by being about differ-
ent possible worlds. (The actual world is, a fortiori, possible.)  
This difference in meaning between relativized and nonrelativ-
ized claims is analogous to the difference in meaning regarding the ethi-
cal subjectivist claims “x is immoral to John” and “x is moral to Jane” as 
opposed to the ethical realist claims “x is immoral” and “x is moral.” In 
both cases the indexed, relativized claim-pairs are consistent but the 
nonindexed, nonrelativized, or absolute claim-pairs are inconsistent. 
The problematic implication for paleo-compatibilism is that even if the 
indexed, relativized claims “the universe is deterministic in ultimate reali-
ty” and “persons sometimes exhibit free will in conventional reality” are 
consistent, the nonindexed, nonrelativized, or absolute claims “the uni-
verse is deterministic” and “persons sometimes exhibit free will” remain 
inconsistent.  
Arguably, if conventional reality is fully compatible with ultimate 
reality, then all macro-level facts about lecterns and such are traceable to 
ultimate-level micro-facts. But if some conventional facts are not tracea-
ble to ultimate-level facts, then the two levels do not seem fully compati-
ble. The paleo-compatibilist can say that conventional items that do not 
reduce to ultimate items are not conventional truths, properly speaking. 
Thus, the paleo-compatibilist may set aside false conventional claims, 
and insist that reality admits of two correct levels of description, one of 
which is not technically true from the perspective of the other, but 
which remains valid relative to a nonalethic (not truth theoretic) stand-
ard—it fits with conventionally recognized norms of linguistic practice. 
This is, basically, what paleo-compatibilism asserts.13 But if pragmatically 
                                                             
13 Whereas many Western reductionists treat the reduced level as ontologically inferior, 
most Buddhist Reductionists treat both levels as almost equally real. Some Buddhists 
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valid descriptions are technically false, we do not seem to have “two 
truths,” two correct descriptions of reality. Because the traditional com-
patibilism question is concerned with the consistency of unqualified, 
nonrelativized claims, that is, with both claims being equally true, both 
traditional compatibilists and incompatibilists alike are likely to with-
hold assent here. 
The idea that some kinds of truths are false is puzzling, although 
we will discuss some models below in which it is not. It might be better, 
however, to say—just as Siderits says about the traditional compatibilism 
question being semantically ill-formed—that the claim “conventional 
truths are ultimately false” is itself an ill-formed claim (that, perhaps, 
has only didactic conventional value). This line of reasoning seems to 
come into play later on in the more developed version of Siderits’s ac-
count, when he claims that the two discourse domains are semantically 
insulated (“Reductionism”), as we shall see. But there are more substan-
tive issues here. 
The problem with reducing free will is that conventional things 
that putatively make up free will—say, deliberations and choices—may 
be traceable to (thus “compatible” with) neural firings, but if noncon-
scious electrochemical determinants completely account for choices, then 
choices are causally impotent, unfree. Because the traditional compati-
bilism problem is precisely the worry that nonagential forms of determin-
ism (such as neural determinism) undermine free will, what may be de-
scribed as paleo-compatibilism’s “compatibility of bifurcated descrip-
tions” seems not only to circumvent the problem, but to obscure and ig-
nore it.  
I said earlier we would discuss other models of different truth 
levels that are less problematic. Thus, Siderits (“Expressible”) makes an 
                                                                                                                                                       
consider conventional reality delusional, however, and some consider both identical. 
See Thakchoe (“Theory”).  
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analogy between the notion of “fictional truth” and conventional truth, 
where the former refers to the idea that certain propositions are “true” 
within a work of fiction, such as, say, the lines uttered by Hamlet. Sider-
its’s analysis appeals to the notion of counterfactuals, whereby, had the 
antecedents (of certain counterfactuals) been true, then their conse-
quents (which otherwise involve fictional truths) would be nonfictionally 
true. Simplifying, had the play (Hamlet) been true, then fictional claims 
about Hamlet would be nonfictionally true. By analogy, if persons were 
ultimately real, then their choices would be free in the responsibility-
entailing sense. The self is ultimately unreal, but choices remain free in 
the responsibility-entailing sense within the context of person-discourse, 
just as although Hamlet is ultimately unreal, he remains highly self-
conscious within the context of Hamlet-discourse. Different discourse do-
mains admit of different conventions governing valid modes of expres-
sion and claims. 
This counterfactual analysis is promising; however, as argued 
above (regarding actual versus counterfactual worlds), counterfactuals 
are, technically, definitionally incompatible with facts in the unqualified 
or nonrelativized sense. This counterfactual explication is thus vulnera-
ble to the objection that although the counterfactually indexed, relativ-
ized claims about agency are consistent with determinism, the nonin-
dexed, nonrelativized claims remain absolutely inconsistent. It also ig-
nores the analogical implication that choices would only be free in the 
responsibility-entailing sense if the self were real, just as facts about 
Hamlet would only be true if Hamlet were true, neither antecedent of 
which is satisfied.  
This also resembles the traditional compatibilist’s so-called “con-
ditional analysis”: an agent is free if she satisfies the condition that she 
could have done otherwise had she wanted to (to which the critic replies: 
she never could have wanted otherwise than she was determined to 
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want). It also suggests that the conventional world is fictional—hardly a 
basis for concluding free will exists. Buddhism does, however, speak of all 
conventional reality as dreamlike: “Buddhahood” is, by definition, awak-
ening. Is conventional reality, then, a kind of dream reality? When I fly in 
dreams, it feels great, but I’m not really flying. Is freedom so? An ordi-
nary person asks an enlightened person: When we awaken, will we have 
free will? The enlightened person replies: No, but until then you dream 
you do, and it is appropriate to speak as if you do. The principle of chari-
table interpretation suggests that this is not what paleo-compatibilism 
means. The paleo-compatibilist means to convey that the level of de-
scription that includes responsible agents is valid, but not as valid as that 
regarding ultimate reality’s micro-constituents. 
Some of the hesitance on the part of traditional compatibilists 
and incompatibilists regarding the compatibility of items spanning bi-
furcated discourse domains relates to the complexity of the notion of 
reduction itself. Thus, let us unpack this notion relative to its contrast 
terms. In Persons (chapter one), Siderits argues that there are three major 
metaphysical options available for the issue of whether something ex-
ists: nonreductive realism, eliminativism, and reductionism—in short, 
yes, no, and sort of. Nonreductive realists claim that entities of a certain 
sort really exist as such: “I do believe in ghosts!” Eliminativists claim 
that certain entities do not exist at all: “There is no Santa!” Reductionists 
claim that entities of a certain sort turn out on analysis to be entities of 
another, more ontologically primitive sort: “The genome explains hered-
ity, but it is just a complex pattern of ultimately quantum phenomena.”  
This example of reduction is not so troubling. But consider an-
other example that is: “There is a Santa, sort of, but he is just some guy 
on the department store payroll in a Santa costume, and parents bring 
their children to sit on his lap while he plays the role of the magical San-
ta, somewhat like an actor in a play.” Growing up with the belief in San-
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ta, only to see it reduced, so to speak, to this, provides little comfort—
little salvaging of what was thought to be of value. Realism about our 
minds and souls seems unrealistic, ironically, in light of much of what we 
know (like knowing there is no real Santa), so it is hard to maintain. 
Eliminativism is easier to maintain in that regard, but threatens to com-
pletely jettison all this is of value in the humanistic conception. Reduc-
tionism tries to salvage some of it, but whereas it may salvage the ge-
nome and the like, it threatens to cheapen the bulk of what is of value to 
us, by converting the equivalent of the magical Santa in all that is hu-
manistic into the equivalent of the department store Santa. As the most 
complicated of the three options, reductionism needs further unpacking.  
The nonbasic or “special” sciences may be reducible to quantum 
terms (hereafter, “quantumese”), but geneticists do not speak quantu-
mese because physicists have not mapped out the genome in quantu-
mese; even if they had, those indefinitely long quantumese conjunctions 
would be useless to geneticists. Thus, reductionists do not eliminate ge-
netic semantics, as doing so would undermine genetic research. Genetic 
reductionism acknowledges the validity of genetics and the greater va-
lidity of quantum physics: genome-talk identifies certain complex pat-
terns of quantum phenomena associated with heredity, which pattern-
level is of interest to geneticists. Thus, genetic reductionism represents a 
middle-path position between nonreductive genetic realism (“genes re-
ally exist”) and genetic eliminativism (“genes do not exist at all”). This 
much seems quite sensible and promising. 
However, the conjunction of genome-involving and quantumese 
reality-descriptions involves no contradictions, unlike the conjunction 
of claims about Wx and Wy. Which of these conjunctions is analogous to 
the conjunction of claims about free will and determinism? Conventional 
descriptions of agency depict macro-level behavior (agents deliberating, 
making choices, acting). To describe the action, “I sit voluntarily on a 
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chair,” in quantumese would require a computer program few humans 
could understand, even if nothing was lost, technically, in translation. 
But to treat people as “just” complex patterns of quanta, however true 
that may be in quantumese, seems to mischaracterize us. A paleo-
compatibilist could reply with an analogy: only one who cannot read 
sheet music cannot equally well grasp the musical beauty of a Mahler 
composition on both the level of hearing its performance and reading its 
notations. The implication is that for the quantumese cognoscenti, how-
ever few there may be, nothing is lost in translation, and perhaps pre-
cisely because so few of us read the sheet music of ultimate reality (ana-
logically speaking), this justifies the pragmatic discourse domain of con-
ventional reality.  
There may be no problem in general here, but we come directly 
to confront the main problem insofar as Buddhism classically denies that 
“I” reduces to ultimate-level vocabulary (say, “ultimatese”), which sug-
gests failure of reduction—conventional falsehood. It is not even obvious 
that “voluntarily” reduces; but if something does not reduce, this seems 
more like the incompatibility of Wx and Wy than the compatibility of 
genes and quanta. The problem is, metaphorically, that the magical San-
ta does not really reduce to the department store Santa: although the 
make-believe magical being does not exist (eliminativism), because chil-
dren see department store Santas, they falsely believe he does exist (er-
ror theory). The “I” who is believed to possess autonomy is the equiva-
lent of the magical Santa: a Cartesian soul-stuff-constituted homunculus 
thought to be entirely nonphysical and to exert telekinetic-like mental 
powers over the physical brain and body. That entity, like the magical 
Santa, appears to be eliminated in Buddhism (although this is a conten-
tious interpretation that will be discussed further), not reduced to some 
naturalized department store substitute found in its place, the analysis 
of which explains the former false belief. The autonomy that is conven-
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tionally construed as essential to humanism rests significantly on this 
sort of misconception. 
Because “autonomy” conjures up an inflated Cartesian concep-
tion of persons most philosophers have outgrown, most writing on free 
will recently have restricted themselves to the notion of free will “in the 
responsibility-entailing sense,” or “responsible agency,” for short. The 
justification for discussing the allegedly anachronistic saw of free will is 
that most normative institutions and the network of reactive attitudes 
(resentment, remorse, and so on) presuppose attributions of responsible 
agency. It seems intuitive that “responsible” will be even more difficult 
to reduce to quantumese, if not impossible. But free will may also be not 
responsibility-entailing and purely physical. Consider the following phil-
osophical fiction or “phi-fi” case (compare “sci-fi”). 
Suppose genetically engineered cyborg soldiers, designed to lack 
hedonic sensation and the left pre-frontal cortical development associ-
ated with empathy, are incapable of moral reasoning or Skinnerian con-
ditioning.14 Suppose these sentient beings can access built-in random-
photon-emitting-type neural subroutines to disengage from determinis-
tic programming (making them unpredictable), toggle sensorimo-
tor/neural subsystems on-line/off-line, and so on. It is theoretically pos-
sible that such beings are superior to us in terms of self-regulation—
autonomy-wise. Thus, there may be free will not in the responsibility-
entailing sense. Interestingly, cyborg-autonomy, like the genome, pre-
sumably would correspond to quantumese facts. To the extent Buddhist 
Reductionism can treat responsible agency as similar to phi-fi cyborg 
agency, which is presumably reducible, but also account for moral rea-
soning, say, as a deliberative system’s capacity to recognize and respond 
appropriately to moral reasons (which presumably could be identified in 
                                                             
14 Contrary to most Buddhist thought, hedonic sense and sentience are noncoextensive, 
for certain primitive life forms with sensorimotor abilities experience no pleasure or 
pain; see Repetti (Response). 
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naturalistic terms, for example, on a consequentialist model according to 
which hedonic values are empirically measureable),15 it seems possible 
for free will even in the responsibility-entailing sense to be reducible. 
Paleo-compatibilism addresses free will “in the responsibility-
entailing” sense, affirming that responsible agents exist at the conven-
tional but not the ultimate level, although facts at the ultimate level 
ground our attributions of the relevant elements of agency that make it 
true at the conventional level that, say, Jones performed a certain action 
and is responsible for it. Siderits sets forth a variety of arguments in 
support of this bifurcation and why Buddhist Reductionists must opt for 
a strong version of it according to which the two domains are, as I men-
tioned earlier, “fully semantically insulated,” a view he calls “semantic 
dualism” (“Reductionism”). His arguments in support of full semantic 
insulation appear sound, but they rest on a fairly sophisticated analysis 
of other doxological requirements of Buddhism implicated thereby; they 
are extremely complex and subtle, and thus they go beyond our con-
cerns.16 Nonetheless, I present some challenges below to the notion of 
semantic insulation that may be raised independently of his extended 
doxological/theoretical defenses. 
 The plausibility of paleo-compatibilism seems to boil down to 
what it means for one of two truths to reduce to another, their semantic 
insulation notwithstanding (for now). The two truths doctrine admits of 
many interpretations, which suggest different models of reduction. Let 
us sketch a few, to place the paleo-compatibilist interpretation in con-
text.  
                                                             
15 Semi-compatibilists conceive the possibility of determined responsible agency as the 
determined ability of an agent to be reason-responsive, particularly with respect to 
moral reasons. I have described this reason-responsive ability more specifically along 
Buddhist ethical lines as “Dharma-responsiveness”; see Repetti (“Meditation”). 
16 See Siderits (Persons) for the full account, but recall that he is not affirming this view, 
but rather using it as part of a larger dialectical progression. 
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For the Mahāyāna schools, ultimate truths are the real 
way that phenomena exist, their emptiness of naturally 
being the basis of names, or of being a different entity 
from consciousness, or of truly existing, or of inherently 
existing. But for the Hīnayāna schools, ultimate truths are 
certain kinds of things themselves. (Cozort and Preston 
55) 
Pre-Mahāyāna17 Buddhists construe “truths” as things, which departs 
from the analysis of “true” as a predicate of propositions; as Cozort and 
Preston insist, it “refers to the objects themselves” (54), for example, nir-
vāṇa and dhammas (elementary micro-constituents of aggregates).18 
Cozort and Preston summarize four main Buddhist schools of thought on 
the two truths: Vaibhāṣikas construe conventional truths as nonultimate 
phenomena and ultimate truths as irreducible atoms and phenomena 
that remain recognizable even when analyzed into parts; Sautrāntrikas 
Following Reasoning construe conventional truths as nonmomentary 
phenomena and ultimate truths as momentary phenomena; and Cit-
tamātrins, Svātantrika Mādhyamikas, and Prasāṅgika Mādhyamikas all 
construe conventional truths as all phenomena other than emptinesses 
and ultimate truths as emptinesses, although Cittamātrins view empti-
nesses slightly differently and Svātantrikas also construe nonexistent 
things (that appear to ordinary people as if they exist) as conventional 
truths (57). Some describe the two truths as interdependent (because all 
phenomena are empty), thereby avoiding any dichotomy.19  
                                                             
17 Cozort and Preston use the Mahāyāna (“Greater Vehicle”) term “Hinayāna” (“Lesser 
Vehicle”) to refer to pre-Mahāyāna Buddhism (most early schools of Indian Buddhism, 
of which Theravāda is the remaining living tradition), but many find this term loaded. 
18 The lower case term “dhamma” is Pāli; it is “dharma” in Sanskrit. I use “dhamma” only 
to (acoustically) differentiate between it and the upper case term, “Dharma,” only be-
cause “Dharma” is more widely used among Anglophone speakers. 
19 Thakchoe (“Theory”). 
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Siderits acknowledges that he is deploying the (Ābhidharma-
based, atomistic) pre-Mahāyāna perspective (Persons 14), but for didactic 
purposes he also generalizes, makes comparisons between Western bi-
furcations of reality and the two truths, and makes somewhat casual 
glosses covering both kinds of bifurcations when doing so is instructive 
(call this “Siderits’s first gloss”), as do I. All such comparisons and glosses 
are relevant to assessing paleo-compatibilism, precisely because paleo-
compatibilism is supposed to represent the philosophical potential of 
Buddhist thought with respect to the traditional (Western) problem of 
free will. To the extent any Buddhist theory of free will rests on premises 
not shared by most Buddhists it is vulnerable to objections based on 
shared Buddhist premises, and Siderits’s first gloss is no exception; this 
point extends to premises not shared by non-Buddhists. Insofar as I wish 
to avoid spelling out Buddhist doctrinal differences for every claim Si-
derits or I make, either about his gloss on the two truths or mine, it will 
occasionally be useful for me to gloss over doctrinal differences, for ease 
of reference in assessing the paleo-compatibilist’s general strategy of ap-
plying the two truths to free will. Thus, I propose a pragmatic oversim-
plification as “my gloss”: Ultimate truth is emptiness; conventional truth 
is form (loosely, everything else, the ultimate nature of which is empty).  
Let me explain and further justify my gloss. The two truths—
phenomena and their emptinesses—arguably summarize all reality. 
Some Mahāyāna Buddhists consider them identical. This is the Heart Su-
tra idea that form is emptiness, and vice versa.20 Abstractly, any plausible 
Mahāyāna explanations that subsume pre-Mahāyāna understandings 
into its more inclusive theoretical/interpretive structure apply to my 
gloss, which is already shared implicitly by some pre-Mahāyāna and ex-
plicitly by most Mahāyāna schools. In characterizing two of the three 
marks of existence, anitya (impermanence) and anātman (lacking a self or 
                                                             
20 See Gyatso (Heart) for an explanation of the Heart Sutra. 
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independent nature), the Buddha implied that the ultimate truth is that 
everything is empty, for whatever is impermanent or lacks self (inde-
pendent nature) is empty. The Buddha also spoke of emptiness in con-
nection with the dependently originated nature of the world and the 
khandhas (the five aggregates that constitute experience);21 for the de-
pendent lacks independent existence or self-nature and is empty.  
Further, although Ābhidharmikas count micro-level dhammas as 
ultimately real in one sense, even such dhammas remain empty in anoth-
er sense because they are extremely ephemeral (momentary) and inter-
dependent (two signs of emptiness), and the macro-level perceivable 
items they appear to form are ontologically empty—nonexistent illu-
sions of aggregation. Thus, ultimate truth or reality may be glossed as 
emptiness, and conventional reality as form, or everything else that is 
empty, which includes all sensory/phenomenal experience. As long as 
nothing in the argument requires a more doctrinally nuanced specifica-
tion, it would be irrelevant to object that the gloss is, in effect, a gloss.  
It is tempting to think that the enlightened perceive emptiness 
whereas the unenlightened perceive form. To the enlightened, all form 
or phenomenal experience is empty, dream-like; to the unenlightened, 
all form seems substantive.22 But the enlightened/unenlightened and 
ultimate/conventional distinctions are not coextensive. “Chariot” and 
“Nāgasena,”23 to use classical examples, are conventional language 
(“conventionalese”) constructs that name aggregations of chariot parts 
                                                             
21 See Saṃyutta Nikāya (SN) 22.95 and SN 35.85, respectively. All references to SN and 
other elements of the Pāli Canon are available online at the Access to Insight website, 
available free online at www.accesstoinsight.com (accessed February 21, 2012) and also 
the Pali Canon Online: The Original Words of the Buddha website, available free online 
at http://www.palicanon.org/ (accessed March 26, 2012). 
22 There is an exception for the unenlightened Buddhist who has conceptual but not 
experiential understanding (Thakchoe “Theory”). 
23 The chariot and Nāgasena examples are derived from the classic Buddhist statement 
of mereological reductionism, the Milindapañhā (“Miln”). 
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and person-series that are reducible to ultimately existing entities. Oth-
ers, such as “ātman” (nonphysical soul) or phlogiston do not name reduc-
ible aggregations. Thus, not all conventional items are ontologically 
equal: some are more empty or false than others—those that do not re-
duce. Buddhist Reductionism denies the person Nāgasena exists in ulti-
mate reality but acknowledges that “Nāgasena” denotes validly per-
ceived partite ephemeral phenomena that reduce to ultimately real im-
partite micro-constituents. Conventional truths are the phenomena 
named “Nāgasena” and “chariot,” or, on an equivalent analysis, correct 
predications about them, not the unenlightened understanding of those 
names (as substantive entities). Conventional truths are what are picked 
out by valid (pragmatic) linguistic devices. Instead of referring to a vo-
luminous conjunction of spatiotemporally indexed concatenated wheel 
parts, processes, and so on, even the enlightened will say “chariot.”  
Illustrating his first gloss on this (“Beyond”), Siderits compares 
the two truths with a similar distinction in philosophy of science be-
tween scientific and common sense vocabularies. For example, science 
uses “mass” and “mean molecular kinetic energy,” but common sense 
uses “weight” and “heat.”24 However, Dennett (Brainstorms) identifies a 
multiple-truth-levels spectrum involving perspectival explanatory 
“stances,” for example: intentional (folk psychology), design (algorithmic 
programming), functional (electronic circuits), and physical (quantumese). 
The justification is that level-appropriate vocabularies identify causal 
phenomena relative to our cognitive apparatus and interests: inherited 
traits, inflation, and mouse traps are better explained in genetic, eco-
nomic, and mechanical terms than in quantumese.25 Siderits himself of-
fers a sustained argument (Persons chapter four) that glosses any and all 
valid nonultimate levels as conventional (call this gloss, which virtually 
                                                             
24 Sellars (“Philosophy”). 
25 Schiffer (“Laws”; “Physicalism”). 
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amounts to my gloss, “Siderits’s second gloss”). Let us examine Siderits’s 
second gloss. 
Buddhist and scientific reductionism converge and diverge on 
both levels. Both accept the pragmatic justification of the conventional, 
yet ontologically privilege micro-phenomena, but whereas Ābhidharma 
dhammas are the Buddhist equivalent of quanta, science would not con-
sider an atom-like (impartite) instance of whiteness, to use Siderits’s ex-
ample (“Reductionism”), to be a natural kind or quantumese (ultimate). 
Conversely, Buddhist Reductionists will not likely accept what scientific 
reductionists consider the ultimate reality constituents.26 A problem 
with Siderits’s second gloss is that Siderits argues that for the paleo-
compatibilist, “determinism” is ultimatese and “free will” is convention-
alese, but the idea that “determinism” is ultimatese is problematic.27 De-
terminism may be expressible in quantumese, but because quantum me-
chanics is indeterministic, there is a serious difficulty on the Western 
side of the comparison. Besides, determinism is an agglomerative ab-
straction from universal laws that are themselves counterfactual-
supporting generalizations about countless partite phenomena, none of 
which exist in ultimate reality for paleo-compatibilist mereological re-
ductionists, so there is a serious difficulty on the Buddhist side of the 
comparison. Further, dependent origination is centrally about causal rela-
tions between perceptions, intentions, actions, and the like—all prima facie 
                                                             
26 Even a single (divisible) hydrogen molecule lasts too long to be an Ābhidharma 
dhamma, and quanta are too small. Thus, on my gloss, Buddhist Reductionists who ac-
cept physics must conclude that no conventional things (items of valid perceptu-
al/phenomenal experience) have inherent natures that ground the use of names—there 
are no natural kinds—unless (like atomists who now say physics’ “atoms” are not really 
atoms) they are willing to say Ābhidharma “dhammas” are not really dhammas, but 
physics’ quanta are. 
27 Siderits is espousing the pre-Mahāyāna view, but some Mahāyānists, for example, 
Garfield, also consider dependent origination ultimate; see, for example, Nāgārjuna 
(Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 24.18), although Garfield’s interpretation of this passage has 
been seriously challenged, and the more standard Mahāyānist view is that everything 
in form that is effable—including dependent origination—is conventional. (I owe this 
observation to Siderits.) 
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macro-phenomena. Thus, if either my gloss holds, or if we press quantu-
mese reductionism on Siderits’s first or second gloss (because dhammas 
are not real quanta, they are nonultimate), then the entities posited in 
dependent origination theory are all conventional. If so, determinism 
and free will are same-level—conventional—notions, but then there is no 
warrant for two-tiered theories like paleo-compatibilism.  
The paleo-compatibilist, however, could reply that there are de-
grees along the conventional/ultimate spectrum, or a variety of conven-
tional levels, particularly on the didactic glosses discussed above (the 
scientific element of which explicitly contains a spectrum or tiered mod-
el), and claim that it is confusion among the nodes along this spectrum 
that accounts for these problematic intuitions, not Buddhist Reduction-
ism. This view, the paleo-compatibilist can claim, is internally con-
sistent, even if Buddhist folk physics, so to speak, as it stands, is incon-
sistent with quantum physics. Again, the model itself is being extrapo-
lated from Ābhidharma simply for didactic philosophical purposes, not 
for purposes of armchair micro-physics. 
What, then, about the free will side of the equation? The paleo-
compatibilist thinks “free will” is conventional because it is person-
adjectival and persons are convention-level beings, but this does not 
mean that free will does not reduce: Siderits does think it reduces.28 If the 
natural abilities that go into free will do reduce to dhammas, then there 
seems to be no reason to think free will is an illusion even if we—
persons—do not exactly reduce. This is similar to the claim that even if 
persons are not ultimately real, pains are, despite the idea that pains re-
quire subjects to experience them. (Being the subject of experience does 
                                                             
28 Siderits (personal communication, February 2012). If free will were construed as 
whole-person-level action-origination and thus did not reduce to ultimatese, however, 
because, say, there are illusions about the whole-person-level composite-type entity 
(analogous to illusions about fire’s nature as phlogiston), then free will would involve 
some conventional element incompatible with ultimate truth, reminiscent of Wx and 
Wy. 
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not equate with being a self: enlightened beings lack even a false sense of 
self, but may experience pain.)  
As its meaning unfolds, paleo-compatibilism increasingly resem-
bles traditional compatibilism, which identifies features of action that 
figure in attributions of responsible agency in beings nonetheless com-
pletely governed by nonagential deterministic forces. In later iterations, 
in which Siderits both coins the label for his model, “paleo-
compatibilism,” and sharpens its meaning (“Buddhism” and “Reduction-
ism”), Siderits focuses on the claim that the levels are isolated from, but 
compatible with, each other. Incompatibilists, however, might object 
that this resembles calling the tiger and hare “compatible” because they 
get along when kept apart in cages—“cage compatibilism.” The compatibil-
ity criterion in the Western discussion is logical consistency (noncontra-
dictoriness), and paleo-compatibilism seems to avoid bivalence the way 
subjectivism does (by embedding, relativizing, or indexing its claims). 
But the free will that paleo-compatibilism asserts for conventionalese is 
libertarian—which is by definition indeterministic—and thus the only way 
determinism and indeterminism seem compatible is by being embedded 
within opaque partitions that obscure their mutual exclusivity.  
This resembles a contradiction embedded within a belief system, 
such as when it is true that Jimmy believes that some proposition is true 
under one description but believes that it is false under another descrip-
tion: It is true that Jimmy believes that Clark cannot fly and Jimmy be-
lieves that Superman can fly. As Michael Barnhart noted, Asian philoso-
phers sometimes exhibit a “blissful maintenance of contradiction,” so we 
cannot assume that anyone maintaining two beliefs has a belief about 
their compatibility.29 I have dubbed the violation of this insight “Barn-
hart’s fallacy,” and the sort of “compatibilism” inferred simply because 
two beliefs obtain in the same belief system “Barnhart compatibilism” 
                                                             
29 Barnhart (conversation). 
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(“Earlier”). I do not think paleo-compatibilism is Barnhart compatibil-
ism, but because paleo-compatibilism bears some resemblance to Barn-
hart compatibilism, compatibilists and incompatibilists alike might resist 
it.  
For such skeptics, although Siderits claims paleo-compatibilism is 
just an interesting model, he presents it as a viable one, and it is its via-
bility that philosophers who are not paleo-compatibilists wish to meas-
ure. Relative to the recent state of dialectic among those philosophers 
who are not paleo-compatibilists, however, Siderits cannot simply rest 
one questionable doctrine (paleo-compatibilism) on another (the two 
truths). In his writings on free will Siderits does not really support the 
two truths, but in Persons he does—in depth and with rigor. Within Bud-
dhism it goes without saying that, although Buddhists dispute its inter-
pretation, the two truths doctrine is supported. But Siderits is not only 
addressing Buddhists; he is specifically modeling the philosophical po-
tential of Buddhism for non-Buddhist philosophers. Anyone who would 
dismiss paleo-compatibilism should examine Siderits’s Persons, which 
sets his interpretation of the two truths on solid ground. However, his 
arguments about free will are presented as self-contained journal arti-
cles, so although they may be best understood within the framework in-
formed by his Persons, they may nonetheless also be assessed as they ap-
pear in the self-contained writings in which he has presented them. Let 
us continue with that assessment, then, by looking at what Siderits has 
to say about the self. 
Siderits explains that Buddhism adheres to an ultimate no-self 
doctrine that implies that the person lacks an enduring, unchanging na-
ture, and thus is not the same entity at any two instants, so the later 
stage of this “person-series” does not seem to deserve the karma from ear-
lier stages (“Beyond” 151). Siderits says it makes pragmatic (convention-
al) sense to say that all the stages are of the same person, and thus that 
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the infant and adult Mark Siderits are the same person, but there is no 
ultimate entity that undergoes the changes, only an appropriate causal 
continuity connecting them.30 Thus, he adds, the fact that karmic effects 
accrue to later stages in the person-series as a function of earlier same-
person-series actions poses no injustice, as it might if they accrued to a 
different person-series.31 The two truths suggest that to say “I did it and I 
deserve to be punished” is pragmatically justified (152) and convention-
ally true—but ultimately (not exactly false, but rather) meaningless. For, 
as Siderits has remarked, a “statement cannot be true or false if it lacks 
meaning—in that case it’s just word-salad, not really a statement at all. 
That’s what happens to ‘I deserve punishment’ when assessed at the ul-
timate level.”32 Applying this strategy to the issue of free will, Siderits 
states: 
When we eliminate conventional truth in favor of ulti-
mate truth, we lose our concept of personal identity; but 
the relations among physical and mental constituents of 
person-series that ground our use of the concept ‘same 
person’ remain. I shall argue that we must likewise lose 
our concept of freedom. (“Beyond” 153) 
This is a promising analogy. Thus, if we substitute “free will” for “per-
son” here, we can make a parallel argument: 
When we eliminate conventional truth in favor of ulti-
mate truth, we lose our concept of free will; but the rela-
                                                             
30 Here is just one instance of my earlier claim to the effect that causation plays too 
heavy a role in Buddhism for too light a conception of causation. 
31 One may object that if there is no identity, nothing can prevent karma from person-
series-Siderits from accruing to person-series-Repetti, and there could be no basis for 
claiming such transference was unfair. The reply would be that such transferences just 
do not naturally occur, just as pouring water on a basketball just does not ignite it. Ar-
guably, however, only robust causation can prevent such deviant karmic or causal re-
distributions. 
32 Siderits (personal communication, February 2012). 
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tions among physical and mental constituents of volition-
deliberation-action series that ground our use of the con-
cept ‘responsible agent’ remain.  
As far as I can tell, this would satisfy compatibilists who thought it close 
enough to free will in the moral-responsibility-entailing sense. 
But why must we “eliminate” conventional truth, if, as Siderits 
argues (Persons), there are good reasons to favor reductionism over the 
two extremes of nonreductive realism and eliminative nonrealism? Per-
son-series are also phenomena, so on my (and possibly his second) gloss 
they are conventional. The idea that we need to eliminate conventional 
truth reflects the difference between unenlightened and enlightened 
conventional discourse: we want to eliminate unenlightened conventional 
falsehoods (say, about Nāgasena being ātman), but we do not want to elim-
inate enlightened conventional truths (about “Nāgasena” naming an ulti-
mately impersonal person-series). The two truths—on my gloss, phe-
nomena and emptiness—are both always present and necessarily com-
patible: phenomena are not eliminated by emptiness; rather, they are 
what it is that is empty. But if paleo-compatibilists want to affirm that 
some conventional truths are not reducible to ultimate truths, and thus 
they are eliminated on reductive analysis, then this is like Wx and Wy, but 
then the two truths are not really compatible.  
Siderits seems to mean that persons reduce to person-series and 
responsible agents reduce to responsible-agent-series, so they are not 
really “eliminated,” but rather just understood more clearly for what 
they are. Perhaps Siderits was speaking causally when he said “elimi-
nate” here (perhaps he meant “substitute by more accurate language” or 
some such alternative). This casual mode might also explain some of the 
discrepancies that seemingly emerge when all his writings on free will 
are treated as a single series of arguments. For in the first iteration of his 
views on free will (“Beyond”), Siderits argues that we neither have nor 
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lack free will at the ultimate level because there is no ultimate person, 
and a nonperson cannot be free or unfree (just as a rock can be nei-
ther).33 Thus, Siderits concludes, the free will question does not arise at 
the ultimate level (155).34 Siderits says Buddhism therefore goes “beyond 
compatibilism.” Shortly afterwards, in entertaining what an opponent 
might say, Siderits says: “If ultimately there are no persons but only 
physical and mental events in a complex causal series, then the ultimate 
truth about ‘us’ must be that ‘we’ are not free” (“Beyond” 158). But Sider-
its’s point is that it is that sort of reasoning that would conflate the lev-
els. For we cannot say “we” are the person-series (and, given that “our” 
volition-deliberation-action sub-series are appropriately auto-
regulating, “we” are “free”) because “there cannot be identity between 
ultimately real entities and entities that are only conventionally real. But 
this is not to say that ‘we’ do not reduce.”35  
Reduction and identity are not the same. But while this makes 
sense when something conventional disappears at the ultimate level un-
der mereologically reductive analysis, it does not seem equally intuitive 
in cases where nothing seems to disappear, for example, when water re-
duces to H2O: Is not water identical to H2O? A plausible, negative answer 
could draw on the distinction between “wide” and “narrow” conceptions 
                                                             
33 Two objections: First, there is a sense in which a causal stream may be said to be 
“free” if it is unobstructed, say, by a dam. In support of Siderits’s claim, however, 
Frankfurt (“Freedom”) argues that “free will” applies only to volitional beings that can 
suffer its privation. By analogy, rocks cannot be blind. Second, consider a flawed claim 
analogous to Siderits’s claim that we neither have nor lack free will because only per-
sons either have it or lack it: we neither experience pain nor do not experience pain 
because there are no selves (subjects of experience, experiencers) in ultimate reality (as 
if person-series that are not persons cannot experience pain). In Siderits’s defense, it 
may be said that because there are no subjects of experience in ultimate reality, it is 
neither true nor false that such subjects experience pain. But there remains a sense 
that even if subjects are not selves in the sense denied by Buddhists, there may be pain 
experiences in ultimate reality. 
34 But on my gloss and perhaps also his, no questions arise at the ultimate level, so this 
prima facie plausible solution is somewhat misleading. 
35 Siderits (personal communication, February 2012). 
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of semantic/psychological content, for example, where, arguably, on the 
wide conception “water” has a hidden indexical that tags water-like stuff 
in the proximal (wide) environment that played a causal role in the for-
mation of the water concept, as opposed to some water-like concept that 
exists entirely in the (narrow, Cartesian) head, to paraphrase Putnam 
(“Meaning”). Putnam’s ingenious “Twin Earth” scenario depicts a doppel-
gänger with a narrowly identical (psychologically indistinguishable) wa-
ter concept but a widely different (environmentally distinct) water con-
cept, say, because the (water resembling) substance there (which be-
haves perceptually identically) is composed of xyz. If the concept is nar-
rowly identical, but widely different, then, arguably, narrow water re-
duces to wide water, but is not identical—it cannot be, because H2O and 
xyz are not. In this (or a similar) way, then, reduction and identity are 
not the same. 
What of the abilities that constitute free will? Siderits’s analysis 
of volitional regulation resembles Frankfurt’s, such that free will in-
volves approval of the volitions on which one acts.36 However, Siderits 
treats volition as if paleo-compatibilism parses it as ultimate, person-
series-level stuff, not conventional. Presumably, anything may be ana-
lyzed at an ultimate or conventional level, or a mix of both, as per our 
spectrum and degrees discussion above. But Siderits’s opponent again 
might charge that if person-series and deliberation-series are both ulti-
mate, then a conventional person that has conventional free will just is 
an ultimate person-series that exhibits ultimate volition-deliberation-
action-series regulation. Siderits would reply that this sounds like paleo-
compatibilism enough for his purposes, except that it slightly misunder-
stands the “just is” in the Buddhist Reductionist (semantic dualist) way—
                                                             
36 On Frankfurt’s model, when an agent acts on a volition the agent approves of, this 
exhibits an effective meta-volition (a volition about a volition), and free will involves 
such effective (volition-controlling) volitional/meta-volitional harmony. For a Bud-
dhist account along similar lines see Repetti (“Meditation” and Counterfactual).  
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not as attributing identity, but as asserting certain relations among dif-
ferent kinds of utterance. This is subtle, but it will do. 
 If person-series and volition-regulating deliberation-series are 
not ultimate, however, but conventional, then conventional beings have 
conventional free will. Either way, we might have free will without lev-
els-conflation or even levels-crossing. The volition-regulating view of free 
will is arguably conventional, because conventionalese is not about emp-
tiness, but phenomena, such as “red apple.” On my gloss, perceptual red-
ness is a valid cognitive phenomenon. Thus, the claim “red apples exist” 
is (valid) conventional.37 Likewise, on my gloss, volitional functions that 
constitute free will on the analysis Siderits implicitly accepts (such as 
approving one’s volition) are conventional because they are not about 
the emptiness of phenomena, but the (introspectively and interoceptive-
ly) perceived phenomena.  
There seem to be many ways in which something may be under-
stood as conventional, and shifting among these senses may be what 
generates the appearance of discrepancy. As suggested earlier, it may be 
reasonable to view conventionality along a spectrum, where, for exam-
ple, persons, tables, and other macro-level mereological wholes are at 
the far end of the conventional side, their smaller parts are still conven-
tional (because they themselves are not impartite) but are closer to the 
ultimate side, and the impartite and the emptiness of everything is at the 
far end of the ultimate side. In the didactic articulation of many of the 
ideas in this discourse, both in Siderits’s specific claims and his glosses, 
as well as in my analyses, claims are made about items occupying differ-
ent nodes along this spectrum, and that is likely what gives rise to the 
                                                             
37 However, for some (Ābhidharmikas), perceived redness is a dhamma, a basic pattern, 
and thus ultimate, though perceived apples are not dhammas, so they are conventional. 
(This observation illustrates the tedium that would otherwise ensue regarding spelling 
out all the doctrinal differences for each claim here, absent both my and Siderits’s 
glosses.) 
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appearance of discrepancy. Let us keep this in mind as we examine both 
paleo-compatibilism and possible objections to it. 
Thus, suppose a monk, asked why he gives away food while col-
lecting alms, claims, “Because I feel sorry for the destitute.” The monk’s 
claim describes phenomenal experience with mudita (sympathetic ap-
preciation) and its volitional dynamics leading to his actions. The claim 
is not about the emptiness of the phenomena, but the phenomena, so it 
is a conventional claim that might satisfy compatibilist criteria and 
(along with similar criteria satisfactions) render the act conventionally 
free. Further, if the monk’s reasons are conventional, then those reasons 
are also reasons to think that there are conventional persons, like the 
monk, to whom the (conventionalese) Vinaya (the Buddha’s monastic 
code) applies. For the same analysis that supports the idea that conven-
tional beings possess free will implies that such beings are conventional 
persons: phenomenal beings that possess self-regulating causal powers 
(for example, anger control)38 that conventionally impersonal-type se-
ries—such as rivers—lack.39 Siderits’s claim is not that free will involves 
levels-conflation, but that the traditional compatibilist/incompatibilist 
debate does, in disputing whether (conventional) free will is compatible 
with (ultimate) determinism. But a traditional compatibilist, reasoning 
along the lines depicted in the monk example, could say that the voli-
tional causes that determine choices are on the same level as the person, 
conventional, so there is no levels-crossing; so could anyone who con-
siders everything but emptiness conventional. 
Siderits later sharpens this contrast, asserting “full semantic in-
sulation between the two discourses” (semantic dualism) (“Reduction-
                                                             
38 Śāntideva (Bodhicāryavatāra 6), referenced in the bibliography as Shantideva and 
Padmakara (Bodhisattva), discusses anger control. 
39 Frankfurt (“Freedom”) defines a “person,” roughly, as a being with meta-volitions 
and nonpersons as beings that lack meta-volitions, such as animals that simply act on 
whatever volition arises. 
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ism” 36). But how can one level of reality relate to another if the lan-
guages used to describe them cannot make contact? Siderits suggests 
that conventionalese “supervenes on” ultimatese (“Buddhism”). Though 
in his writings on free will Siderits does not explicate how this abstract 
relation connects insulated discourses, he does explain what sort of su-
pervenience he has in mind elsewhere (Persons, chapter one). He also ex-
plains why he thinks it is important to keep both discourse domains se-
mantically insulated, noting that this very insulation poses a problem in 
terms of being able to express the two truths without violating the insu-
lation (“Expressible”). Siderits’s keen analyses (involving the notion of 
meta-language, too complex to repeat here) indirectly support the claim 
that his parsing of the two truths is required for Ābhidharmika Reduc-
tionists, but not necessarily other Buddhists.  
We cannot summarize all his arguments for Buddhist Reduction-
ism, but his distinction between reductive and nonreductive superveni-
ence is relevant (Persons). Reductive supervenience is the idea that the 
items in the domain to be reduced, D2, to those in the more basic do-
main, D1, map onto those items in an appropriate way, such that the 
facts at D1 both determine and explain those at D2. This sort of mapping 
relation is fairly unproblematic when a branch of science easily reduces 
to more basic science, such as chemistry to physics, but problematic 
when mental states are said to supervene on neural states, particularly 
for those who think the latter cannot adequately explain the former. 
This is where nonreductive supervenience may be brought in, as the 
claim of the determination of D2 by D1 (no change in D2 without one in 
D1), but where everything about D1 is insufficient to explain everything 
about D2, so D2 has some sort of explanatory autonomy.  
To get a handle on this, we might think of things connected with 
the narrow conception of water as at D2 and those connected with the 
wide conception of water as at D1. Some philosophers of mind have 
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claimed, for example, that although some mental states, such as volition, 
supervene on physical ones in which they are realized (say, in the config-
uration of synaptic firings instantiated synchronically with that voli-
tion), these mental states remain unexplained by the physical states be-
cause any intentional state is always “about” something, whereas purely 
physical items are never “about” anything: electrochemical neural dis-
charges lack intentional content—meaning—or what Searle called “as-
pectual shape” (Mind chapter 7). This might be a case of nonreductive 
supervenience, and, as Siderits notes, some early Buddhists possibly held 
this view of persons.40 
It is commonly accepted that different neural-state configura-
tions might instantiate that same volition and that other instances of the 
same neural configuration might lack that volition if an alternate-world-
inhabiting (atom-for-atom-identical) doppelgänger could lack conscious-
ness altogether. To the extent semantic dualism is akin to mind-body 
dualism, it shares such mapping problems. Anyone who believes in free 
will seems implicitly committed to the reality of conscious mental states, 
and neuroscience places a burden on the folk psychologist to come up 
with something like a supervenience relation. To Siderits’s credit, he of-
fers plausible arguments for reductive supervenience; but they are in-
credibly complex and subtle, and this issue is too problematic to resolve 
here.  
Thus, just as it may beg the question (in the “looser” sense that 
the premise is as problematic as the conclusion, as opposed to question-
begging in the tighter sense of circular reasoning), contextually, to ap-
peal to the problematic two truths doctrine to support a position on free 
will, so too it may beg the question to appeal to supervenience to sup-
port semantic dualism. We now have stacked puzzles—free will, two 
                                                             
40 Pudgalavādins (those affirming a “pudgala” or “person” doctrine) may have held this 
intermediary view (between nonreductive realism and reductionism); see Siderits (Per-
sons 89-91).  
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truths, semantic dualism and supervenience. Such question-stacking ap-
pears as a weakness, but in fairness to Siderits it may be—and I think it 
actually is—indicative of the broadly coherent, multidimensional ex-
planatory purchase of his theory. It ought not to be incumbent on read-
ers of Siderits’s individual articles on free will to digest his entire corpus 
on Reductionism in order to assess his amicus brief on behalf of paleo-
compatibilism, and we can only devote so much space to that larger 
work here. Those who wish to more fully explore this larger project are 
encouraged to direct their attention to Siderits’s brilliant treatise, Per-
sons. Having noted the extent to which paleo-compatibilism is grounded 
in this larger dialectical and explanatory framework, then, let us focus 
the remainder of the assessment of paleo-compatibilism on its articula-
tion in Siderits’s articles on paleo-compatibilism.  
Siderits says that at the ultimate level “there are events that cor-
respond to what we ordinarily call deliberating and willing” (“Beyond” 
155), and this is why he thinks the volitional analysis applies at the ulti-
mate level. Does free-will-supporting conventionalese about volitional 
regulation map onto ultimatese about micro-level volitional phenomena, 
and does conventionalese about persons map onto ultimatese about per-
son-series, such that conventionally responsible agents reduce to ulti-
mate series that ground their conventional reality? This seems to be 
what Siderits intends, and that would be a welcome argument from the 
compatibilist perspective, but in light of the complexity of everything he 
says that bears on the subject, it is not entirely clear.  
Siderits’s suggestive approach has great merit, but some of that 
merit is obscured by the complexity of its many details: 
To see myself as capable of acting freely, I must view my-
self as the sort of entity that can endorse the actions it 
performs. This requires that I take deliberating and will-
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ing as abilities or faculties that I possess. This possibility is 
denied us at the ultimate level of truth. (155) 
Siderits thinks “this possibility is denied” because “persons” do not exist 
ultimately, though we exhibit these abilities. Siderits continues: 
At that level there are events that correspond to what we 
ordinarily call deliberating and willing; but there are no 
persons who are the authors of those events, for a person 
is a mere conceptual fiction that is constructed out of 
those and other events . . . . Thus, it is only at the conven-
tional level that an action may be said to be performed 
freely. (155)  
But if “a person is a mere conceptual fiction”—a mental entity—“that is 
constructed out of those and other events,” where those events are men-
tal, that is like saying shoes are not leather because there are no shoes, only 
leather-shoe parts.41 
 There seems to be an implicit asymmetry in the treatment of 
items here if, say, conventional volitions are said without qualification to 
correspond to ultimate events, but persons and free will are qualified as 
being “only” conventional. If there are ultimate events that correspond 
to conventional volitions that, arguendo, might satisfy some criteria for 
free will, then cannot ultimate events also correspond to conventional 
free will? If there are events at the ultimate level that correspond to de-
liberations, then there are arguably events at the ultimate level that cor-
respond to the sorts of things that constitute responsible agency—that 
correspond to free-will-exhibiting agents (persons). Conversely, the 
same reason to think there is no ultimate free will or ultimate person 
                                                             
41 Arguably, this objection involves a straw man fallacy, where the intended claim, char-
itably interpreted, is that it is not ultimately true that shoes are made of leather because shoes 
are not ultimately real. But the objection may be restated more charitably: however emp-
ty shoes are ultimately, they are made of leather. The counterexample thus survives. 
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may be used to conclude that there are no ultimate deliberations, as op-
posed to, say, deliberations-series. Persons are changing series of psy-
chophysical events, just like deliberations are, so why is there reductive 
asymmetry between them? Asymmetry—per se—is fine, but not when 
things seem symmetrical.  
 The paleo-compatibilist might again appeal to the graded mac-
ro/micro, conventional/ultimate spectrum to explain any appearance of 
asymmetry: persons, person-series, deliberation, deliberation-series, vo-
lition, volition-series, and so on, down to dhammas and emptiness. Per-
haps our shifting focus along this spectrum is what is generating the 
asymmetry, not the theory. Thus, let us examine this more carefully by 
focusing on just one centrally relevant item here, deliberation.  
 Deliberation is minimally dyadic: it minimally requires considera-
tion of two alternatives. Even if superior beings apprehend many alter-
natives simultaneously, we do not. If each consideration corresponds to 
ultimate micro-events, the only way this micro-series can count as “de-
liberation” is if something links them together, even if that something is 
just a combinatorial or causal pattern/formula. Similarly, it seems there 
can be no “mother” if there is nothing that links together the bearer of a 
zygote and the woman who delivers a baby (Miln). But if this something 
does not exist at the micro-level, the claim that deliberation corresponds 
to ultimate events is problematic. If it does exist at the micro-level, then 
ultimate reals form micro-level deliberation-series that ground the con-
ventional reality of deliberations; however, then ultimate reals could 
equally form micro-level responsible-agency-series that ground the con-
ventional reality of responsible persons. At issue is this asymmetry in 
mereological reduction.  
In his original article (“Beyond”), Siderits implicitly accepted mer-
eological reductionism; now he explicitly asserts that “Buddhist Reduc-
tionists are thoroughgoing mereological reductionists” (“Reductionism” 
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34). This implies that “persons are reducible without remainder to com-
pletely impersonal entities because all partite entities are reducible 
without remainder to their parts” (34). But then the question is: Why are 
some reductions privileged, but others not? Buddhist mereological re-
ductionism is articulated classically by Nāgasena: chariot parts have no 
relationship with each other independent of those imposed by our 
needs, so chariots are not natural kinds (nothing inherent in them 
grounds the name “chariot”), but pragmatically justified linguistic con-
vention names their configuration “chariot,” as with the label for the 
psychophysical series “Nāgasena,” the configuration of elements of 
which lacks self-nature (Miln).  
Mechanical artifacts intuitively lack any whole-level feature that 
is irreducible to their parts, but Nāgasena’s intentionality and con-
sciousness seem irreducible to their parts. This apparently composition-
al difference would at least provide some ground for mereological asym-
metry, but Buddhist Reductionism denies any such ultimate difference 
here, as Buddhism more generally decomposes even consciousness and 
the like into the interdependent interaction of sense-organs and objects 
of experience. If “all partite entities are reducible without remainder to 
their parts,” however, then just as there is equally no chariot or person, 
so too there are no Buddhas, volitions, karmic merit, thoughts—eyes 
reading this—or anything apart from the scientific or Buddhist version 
of quanta, possibly also excluding quanta if they are divisible even into 
homogeneous parts. But as with any other reductio ad absurdum argu-
ment, the allegedly absurd conclusion may be embraced, and Buddhist 
Reductionists do embrace this conclusion. They dispel its apparent ab-
surdity by saying that all these things that technically do not exist in ul-
timate reality nonetheless do exist conventionally. This suggests an iron-
ic use of cliché: Buddhist Reductionists apparently can have and eat their 
(ultimately nonexistent) cake too.  
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Reductionists claim the person is a mere conceptual fiction, but 
maybe reductionism is in a similar category. Reduction involves identify-
ing micro-constituents as ultimately real, but those micro-constituents 
must either be indivisible/impartite entities (atoms)42 or divisi-
ble/partite entities (nonatoms).43 Both options are deeply problematic.44 
If micro-reality is nonatomistic, then for mereological reductionists all 
macro- and micro-levels are partite—equally unreal—and this ontologi-
cally egalitarian option unveils no ontologically privileged ultimate real-
ity. Thus, mereological reductionists—who affirm that all macro-level 
partite wholes are ultimately unreal and that only micro-level impartite 
entities are ultimately real—must reject either mereological reduction-
ism or nonatomism. That leaves recalcitrant mereological reductionists 
one option, atomism.  
Suppose there is an atomic level, where, say, all items are homo-
geneous quanta. However, as some Tibetan lamas say,45 even the smallest 
particles can be distinguished into north, south, east, and west sides. 
This makes sense because if they have no sides, as Parmenides noted, 
there cannot be a plurality of them, but Ābhidharma posits a plurality of 
dhammas. (Without anything to differentiate them, no less, it is logically 
impossible that they could aggregate to even appear as anything that 
                                                             
42 Ābhidharmikas assert that only dhammas are ultimately real, but this supports my 
gloss that everything else (all the phenomena of experience, except its perceivable 
dhamma fragments, if any) is, by default, conventional.  
43 Mahāyānists deny that dhammas are ultimately real, insisting that the ultimate truth 
is that reality is empty, which also supports my gloss that everything else (apart from 
emptiness) is, by default, conventional. In Persons, Siderits seems to favor this concep-
tion insofar as it occupies a node along the progression of his four-staged argument 
closer to its final conclusion. 
44 This approach is intuitively physical, one might object, but Ābhidharmikas are explic-
itly committed to the existence of nonphysical dhammas. Siderits’s argument does not 
assert the existence of nonphysical dhammas, but neither does he deny their existence. 
Siderits makes clear, recall, that he is only extrapolating his model from Ābhidharma, 
not that any Ābhidharmika actually advocates paleo-compatibilism. Nothing in paleo-
compatibilism excludes the possible existence of purely mental (nonphysical) dhammas. 
45 I owe this reference to Tibetan lamas to Dan Cozort. 
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may be differentiated.) Thus, they must have sides, so each such entity 
admits of regions (parts), each region itself admits of regions, and so on, 
ad infinitum. Thus, arguably, there is no true atom, thus no impartite, on-
tologically superior, ultimate reality. Where does that leave the recalci-
trant mereological reductionist? 
One way to try to evade this objection would be to say that truly 
impartite atoms are dimensionless points that have no sides, regions, or 
parts. That will not work because dimensionless entities are nonphysical, 
but nothing lacking physical magnitude can aggregate to form anything 
at the macro-level, and, conversely, nothing that has physical magnitude 
can be reduced to anything that lacks it. Thus, mereological reduction-
ists affirming ultimate reality must reject atomism along with nona-
tomism. Thus, mereological reductionists seem required to admit that 
there is no mereologically ultimate reality.   
Reasoning like this supports Mahāyāna antirealism, but perhaps 
paleo-compatibilism’s atomistic “tropes” might circumvent the above 
logical dilemma, such as instances of whiteness (all of which are homo-
geneous and thus recognizable even if analyzed into identical segments); 
the Ābhidharma suggests a large but finite number of them aggregate for 
a perceivable moment of (white-perceiving) experience. But if so, it is 
not that nothing partite/composite is real, but that nothing perceivably heter-
ogeneous is real. A regular coffee, once blended, appears perceivably homo-
geneous, thus ultimate, though mereologically divisible into black coffee, 
milk, and sugar (suppose, arguendo, that these constituents are them-
selves homogeneous), just as green appears perceivably homogeneous, 
though mereologically divisible into yellow and blue. If Buddhist Reduc-
tionism is amenable to scientific discovery, it becomes problematic be-
cause photons, photo-receptive optic cells, and so on do not seem hospi-
table to the homogeneous-color-type model of trope-atoms. 
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Atomistic reductionism posits that reductive divisibility comes to 
an end with ultimate trope-like atoms of reality, but this posit—science 
aside—remains undermined by the logical dilemma that anything with 
magnitude is divisible and anything without magnitude cannot be aggre-
gated. Because perceivable phenomena have magnitude, there are no 
atoms; thus, again, for the mereological reductionist there is no ultimate 
reality.  
The Buddhist Reductionist can claim we hit rock bottom when we 
arrive at trope-quanta, the first micro-level populated by homogeneous 
entities, because further divisions only exist mathematically/conceptually, 
and Buddhist ultimate reality is what exists independent of our conceptuali-
zations. However, it seems unprincipled—a distinction without an ontolog-
ically relevant difference—to ontologically privilege homogeneity (black 
coffee) over heterogeneity (regular coffee), particularly when we cannot 
conceive one without the other. Such a preference seems—contra the 
Buddhist Reductionist—to rest on some sort of pragmatic, psychological, 
hence conceptualized item that is intuitively nonprivileged in conceptu-
alization-independent reality. Could this be the presupposition that 
grounds the intuition that ontologically differentiates persons asymmet-
rically from deliberations and volitions, as the paleo-compatibilist thinks 
the former “only” conventional and the latter ultimate? But even if this 
were not problematic, deliberation is dyadic, not homogene-
ous/monadic; so is volition, because it includes (a) conative/teleological 
impulse, toward (b) an intentional object (desired object, experience, or 
state of affairs). If these decompose into homogeneous/monadic parts, 
however, there can be no deliberation-trope or volition-trope among 
them, just as there are no mother-tropes, so it is a stretch to say “there 
are events that correspond to what we ordinarily call deliberating and 
willing” (or mothering) in ultimate reality.  
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Admittedly, similar difficulties challenge many competing Bud-
dhist and non-Buddhist metaphysics, so some of these difficulties are not 
peculiar to Buddhist Reductionism. But to the extent paleo-
compatibilism rests on Buddhist Reductionism, it faces such difficulties, 
regardless of how widespread such difficulties may be. Siderits’s more 
comprehensive four-staged Buddhist synthesis, however, likely resolves 
or circumvents most if not all of them (and actually rests its move from 
Buddhist Reductionism to Buddhist antirealism on similar considera-
tions), but Siderits has yet to articulate the implications of that account 
for free will. 
Turning to free-will-specific claims presented in Siderits’s more 
refined iterations of paleo-compatibilism, Siderits distinguishes four 
paleo-compatibilist theses. The first two are libertarian;46 the last two are 
hard determinist: 
1. Persons are free in the responsibility-entailing sense. 
2. Freedom requires that persons be originating causes. 
3. Nothing could be an originating cause in the required 
sense. 
4. All psychological states are the effects of prior causes. 
(“Buddhist”) 
Siderits argues that (1) and (2) are conventionally true and entail liber-
tarianism, and (3) and (4) are ultimately true and entail hard determin-
ism (“Buddhism”). The paleo-compatibilist considers ultimate hard de-
terminism compatible with conventional libertarianism because both 
are true at different levels.  
                                                             
46 Libertarians think free will and determinism are incompatible; agents are free be-
cause they are originating causes; and thus determinism is false. 
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 On my gloss, both free will and determinism are on the phenom-
enal/form level (conventional). A related Mahāyāna interpretation that 
may be used to articulate a Buddhist soft determinism is interdependent 
origination.47 Mahāyānists argue that there is no potter without a pot, no 
action without an agent (action-performer), and thus the agent/action 
pair is interdependently constituted by the action-performance. This 
conception provides a less inflated conception of the person, one that 
seems intuitively not in need of reducing. Let us thus define “AgentsM” 
(where the superscripted “M” represents “in the Mahāyāna sense”) as 
such interdependent action-performers. Thus, we can substitute 
“AgentsM” for “persons” in Siderits’s (1) and (2), yielding deflationary 
statements consistent with soft determinism: 
1. AgentsM are free in the responsibility-entailing sense. 
2. Freedom requires that AgentsM be originating causes. 
 As even Theravāda scholars have argued, the Buddha thought 
volitional actions entail karma (merit) because they are voluntary, de-
spite how strongly shaped by prior karma, and that they are initiating 
causes, contra the fatalists, because they create new karma and make a 
difference to the event series.48 Thus, (3) and (4) are arguably false, and 
we may substitute the implied “persons” in (3) with “AgentsM”: 
3. AgentsM can be originating causes in the required 
sense.  
 Let us dub “paleo-soft-determinism” the conjunction of these 
modified theses (1)-(3). Ockham’s razor seems to favor paleo-soft-
                                                             
47 An authoritative source for the doctrine of interdependence is Nāgārjuna (Mūlamadh-
yamakakārikā), an early-period source is Kasulis (Zen), and recent-period sources are 
Gier and Kjellberg (“Buddhism”) and Wallace (“Buddhist”). Wallace discusses a 
Mahāyāna model of interdependence, consistent with physics, in which every quantum 
is holographically interconnected. 
48 See Harvey (“Freedom”) and Federman (“Buddha”). 
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determinism over paleo-compatibilism,49 insofar as libertarianism rejects 
scientific determinism and embraces mysterious causation. The paleo-
compatibilist seeks to save the notion of free will implicit in the network 
of beliefs, judgments, and reactive attitudes that constitute our norma-
tive institutions and practices,50 a fine intention consistent with the 
Mahāyāna notion (expressed in Siderits’s final synthesis as semantic 
nondualism) that conventional reality is as it appears. I share this goal, 
but dispense with the unnecessarily heavy metaphysical “baggage,” as 
Fischer puts it (Way), of libertarianism. 
 In his latest relevant publication (“Reduction”), Siderits condens-
es (1)-(4), and maintains free will is conventional and determinism ulti-
mate:  
It can be true both that (1) persons are sometimes the 
originating causes of their actions, for which they are 
then responsible; and (2) each of the impermanent, im-
personal elements in a causal series of psychophysical el-
ements is causally determined by earlier elements. (“Re-
ductionism” 36) 
Let us call these “new-(1)” and “new-(2),” to set them apart from (1)-(4). 
Referring to new-(1)’s libertarianism and new-(2)’s determinism, Siderits 
says new-(1) “is conventionally true” and new-(2) “is ultimately true” 
(36). Because they are true in “fully semantically insulated” discourses, 
new-(1) and new-(2) “cannot be incompatible” (36)—inviting critics’ sus-
picions of cage compatibilism. 
                                                             
49 Ockham’s razor, in Indian philosophy “the principle of lightness,” is the principle of 
explanatory parsimony: always prefer the least risky hypothesis, or, in some interpre-
tations, prefer the one with the fewest ontological commitments. See Baker (“Simplici-
ty”). 
50 Siderits (personal communication February 2012). 
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 As with (1)-(3), new-(1) and new-(2) admit of inflationary and de-
flationary readings. If read in inflated terms of libertarian agents and hard 
deterministic causation, as Siderits does, new-(1) and new-(2) seem con-
tradictory, as new-(1) is indeterministic and new-(2) is deterministic. Some-
one, S, might believe some proposition, P, and also believe its negation, ~P, 
if they manage to partition (semantically insulate) these beliefs from 
each other enough to not notice the conflict, but whereas the belief 
statement “S believes P” is consistent with the belief statement “S be-
lieves ~P,”51 the simple statement “P and ~P” remains contradictory. But, 
if read in the deflated terms of interdependent AgentsM and actions, new-
(1) and new-(2) are compatible in the semantically exposed (un-
insulated) sense; then, paleo-compatibilism is otiose.  
 To support paleo-compatibilism, Siderits quotes the (ironically) 
Mahāyānist Śāntideva, who presents a series of statements (22-31), only 
one of which I repeat here (22), instructing Buddhists to see others’ be-
havior as—according to Siderits—determined by impersonal factors, the 
way bile is, for purposes of anger prevention. Śāntideva then entertains 
an inconsistency objection (32), to the effect that behavior’s impersonal 
causation contradicts the personal agency (arguably, free will) that would 
be required for anger prevention. In reply (32), Śāntideva differentiates 
between anger’s impersonality and the necessity of the assumption of 
personal agency for the Buddhist path.  
22. There is no anger in me toward bile and the like 
though they cause great pain. 
Why anger toward sentient beings? Their anger is also 
due to causes…. 
                                                             
51 Insofar as belief embeds propositions in semantically opaque contexts (propositional 
attitudes), it makes it possible for contradictory propositions to occur unnoticed; recall 
Jimmy’s contradictory beliefs about Clark and Superman. 
77 Journal of Buddhist Ethics 
 
 
32. [Objection:] Prevention [of anger] is thus not appropri-
ate, for who prevents what? 
[Reply:] It [prevention] is taken to be appropriate with re-
gard to dependent origination due to the cessation of suf-
fering. (“Buddhist”; “Reductionism” 31)52  
Siderits thinks verse 22 supports determinism: we do not get angry at 
impersonally caused things, and others’ behavior is impersonally caused. 
This is consistent with hard determinism, but not an argument for it.53 It is 
also consistent with soft determinism. Śāntideva might mean that most 
worldlings54 are so afflicted by (the three poisons of) greed, hatred, and 
delusion that they are virtually hard determined, which warrants excul-
patory reactive attitudes such as nonanger and compassion. Buddhists 
can change behavior upon Dharma reflection, an ability arguably better 
accounted for by soft determinism.55 The worldling may alter behavior 
under similar circumstances, so virtually hard determined behavior can 
remain soft determined if it involves certain unexercised abilities. No 
statement consistent with two theories favors one over the other, ceteris 
paribus. 
                                                             
52 Quoting Śāntideva (Bodhicāryavatāra 6).  
53 Siderits says he does not think this is an argument for hard determinism, but that 
what Śāntideva develops in the subsequent verses is an argument for the conclusion 
that responsibility-entailing freedom cannot exist at the ultimate level; Siderits thinks 
that hard determinism would follow from this only if you were an eliminativist about 
persons, whereas the Reductionist is not an eliminativist. Siderits (personal communi-
cation, February 2012). But he does seem to take paleo-compatibilist theses (3) and (4) 
above to entail hard determinism, so either he does not draw the hard element from 
Śāntideva or I have misinterpreted him to take (3) and (4) to entail hard determinism. 
Another way to put this is: if one does not think the determinism in play is hard, then 
why would one think there’s a need to show it is paleo-compatible? 
54 A “worldling” is a person who has not attained the first level of direct spiritual reali-
zation/transformation, that of “stream entry,” typically precipitated by Buddhist medi-
tative discipline. Thus, most non-Buddhists and many (maybe most) Buddhists are 
worldlings, though non-Buddhists can be stream entrants. I stipulate that I use the 
term loosely to refer to most worldly folks and/or all who are not stream entrants. 
55 For a defense of this claim, see Repetti (“Meditation” and Counterfactual). 
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Siderits thinks verse 32 supports the paleo-compatibilist claim 
that ultimatese hard determinism does not conflict with the needs of 
unenlightened, conventionalese-speaking Buddhist practitioners, who 
must adopt the conventional notion of efficacious agency to follow the 
Buddhist path, thereby evidencing some authoritative support for paleo-
compatibilism. However, if Śāntideva did mean that impersonally caused 
behavior was hard determined, then Śāntideva’s response to the incon-
sistency charge arguably cannot be easily dismissed simply by reference 
to the Buddhist hope of reducing suffering. The idea that by doing some-
thing (contemplating bile-likeness) you can bring something about (anger 
reduction) implies anger is evitable; however, that implication arguably 
favors soft over hard determinism—if it actually does favor either hard or 
soft determinism, but it is enough here that it is, prima facie, logically 
consistent with either. The inconsistency objection Śāntideva entertains, 
therefore, does not obviously target hard determinism; that doctrine is 
not explicit in Śāntideva’s writings. What it explicitly targets is imperson-
ality (nonagential bile-likeness) in worldlings versus personality (agential 
bile-unlikeness) in Buddhists. 
The Buddhist view of worldlings is that they are particularly 
overwhelmed by delusion, which implies their ignorance of dependent 
origination renders them on par with impersonal (nonagential) bile, 
which cannot control itself, whereas verse 32 implies those aware of de-
pendent origination can control themselves to progress soteriologically. 
But the idea that knowledge of impersonal causal/volitional forces leads 
to agential self-regulation and freedom regarding those forces (however 
impersonal, determined) is arguably and intuitively more of a soft than a 
hard determinist idea, although some hard determinists claim that all 
such abilities are consistent with hard determinism.  
 It is one thing for data to be consistent with two theories; it is an-
other for one theory to better accommodate that data. All determinists—
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soft and hard—agree that everything traces to impersonal causes predat-
ing agents’ existence. But they dispute whether our satisfaction of agent-
proximal conditions—the data for the question of theory-superiority at 
issue—suffices for responsible agency. Consider this list of agent-
proximal conditions the satisfaction of which (by agents) counts here as 
data:  
1. An agent can deliberate about competing choices that 
represent alternative futures and by selecting one of 
them she can be the central causal factor that brings 
about that future. 
2. There is a certain harmony between her actions and 
considered judgments or values. 
3. She can alter her values in light of relevant infor-
mation. 
4. She can form effective meta-volitions. 
5. She can alter her volitions to have the sort of will she 
wants.  
6. There is a certain agency-nonundermining history to 
her volitions and meta-volitions. 
7. There is a certain mesh between her volitions and me-
ta-volitions.  
8. She exhibits self-regulating volitional control. 
9. She exhibits counterfactual control over her volitional 
structure. 
10. She would have done otherwise, had she wanted to do 
otherwise. 
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11. She would have done likewise, if she wanted to, even if 
she was able to do otherwise. 
12. She exhibits reason-responsiveness. 
13. Certain agency-undermining manipulative conditions 
are absent. 
All determinists agree that many often possess such abilities, though 
some hard determinists might deny agents ever satisfy some such condi-
tions (say, 9-11).56 But all hard determinists likely accept a “generic hard 
determinist principle”: 
No matter what agent-proximal conditions are satisfied, 
agents never exhibit free will in the responsibility-
entailing sense. 
Soft determinists disagree over which conditions constitute responsible 
agency, but likely accept a “generic soft determinist principle”: 
If certain agent-proximal conditions are satisfied, agents 
exhibit free will in the responsibility-entailing sense. 
Thus, Śāntideva’s worldling may be overwhelmed by conditions that de-
feat her satisfaction of soft determinist responsible agency criteria, but 
this does not mean that no one ever satisfies them (as Śāntideva’s objec-
tion implies, Buddhist aspirants do satisfy them), or that their satisfac-
tion is always insufficient for responsible agency. In replying to the in-
consistency objection, Śāntideva arguably employs implicitly soft de-
terminist reasoning about how agents possessing knowledge of causal 
                                                             
56 As I have argued (Counterfactual), however, this denial presupposes what I termed 
“actualism,” the view that only what is actual at some time is possible, and counterfac-
tuals are never actual, so they are not possible. But determinism is an agglomeration of 
all deterministic laws, but deterministic laws are all counterfactual-supporting general-
izations, in which case actualistic determinism is an oxymoron. 
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operations do not resemble helpless (bile-like) worldlings. This condition 
may be added to the list of conditions hard and soft determinists agree 
some of us satisfy but dispute whether such satisfaction constitutes re-
sponsible agency: 
14. The agent is aware of agent-proximal causal factors 
and general karmic and/or causal condi-
tions/processes that shape her choice parameters, she 
can reflect on which choice is dharmic,57 and she can 
make and effectively act on that choice, even in the 
face of phenomenologically powerful dispositional 
counter-tendencies. 
As I have argued elsewhere (“Meditation”), to the extent Buddhist prac-
titioners cultivate meditative discipline, condition 14 becomes increas-
ingly true of them. The same holds for a variety of free-will-related 
agent-proximal conditions implicit in central tenets of pan-Buddhist 
doxography: 
15. The agent has significantly dharmic views. 
16. She has significantly dharmic volitions. 
17. She has significant skill in selecting/performing 
dharmic actions. 
18. She can exert appropriately calibrated effort. 
19. She has significant one-pointedness skill. 
20. She has significant mindfulness skill. 
Item 14 is derivable from Śāntideva; items 15-20 are from the Eightfold 
Path. These items are not exhaustive, but are among those a Buddhist 
                                                             
57 The term “dharmic” means “Dharma-oriented” (skillful, relative to Buddhism’s prime 
directive, liberation).  
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soft determinist would include in her list of conditions satisfaction of 
which arguably constitutes something like a Buddhist conception of free 
will. Thus, Śāntideva arguably favors soft over hard determinism. 
Refining his analysis of the determinist thread of paleo-
compatibilism, Siderits unpacks the idea that tropes are the ultimate-
reality-level phenomena that determine our mental states: tropes may 
be described as abstract particulars, instantiations of—physical or men-
tal—universals, “such as particular occurrences of white, sweet, cold . . . 
desire, attention, etc.” (“Reductionism” 36). Siderits illustrates these par-
ticulars with the case of a person eating vanilla ice cream who desires 
more. One might hope that whereas purely physical items subject the 
mereological reductionist to the dilemma of infinitely divisible magni-
tude, because tropes are mentality-involving they are not entirely physi-
cal, so they escape this dilemma.58 But, setting aside the idea that mental 
states cannot exist apart from their physical instantiations, even puta-
tively purely mental visual images of white ice cream—whether in the 
form of (at least once removed) mental representations or direct percep-
tions—have magnitude; so, they are infinitely divisible (they cannot be 
real atoms), despite being mental. 
Siderits claims that because no statement seemingly about tropes 
can be conventionally true because trope-talk involves ultimate vocabu-
lary, conventional trope-like-talk must be construed as “person-
adjectival,” whereas ultimate trope-talk is impersonal and “trope-
atomistic” (36). But conventionalese whiteness is not a person-attribute 
just because it is discussed by speakers of conventionalese who accept 
                                                             
58 This “hope” is not meant to represent the view Siderits describes, but just as a hypo-
thetical reason to think there may be logically possible trope-types that escape the di-
lemmas facing physical tropes. Understanding Ābhidharma’s dhammas in the Sautrānti-
ka way as tropes, there will be mental and physical tropes. For them the latter would 
involve occurrences of yellow and sweet. For a modern, they might involve things like 
occurrences of a certain force at a certain point-instant. Siderits (personal communica-
tion, February 2012).  
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personhood; 59 enlightened beings may use whiteness-talk. The white-
ness beings perceive is, on my gloss, phenomenal, thus whiteness-talk is 
conventional. Paleo-compatibilists could say that conventionalese about 
volitions and perceptions is typically attributed to unreal persons, so its 
person-adjectival elements cannot be true ultimately, and ultimate 
events to which volitions and perceptions correspond are real but do not 
correspond to persons, but valid trope-talk can be both conventionally 
and ultimately true.  
For Ābhidharmikas, mental states are high-level aggregates of 
dhammas, indefinitely many (trillions) of which constitute a moment of 
consciousness (Dhamma and Bodhi “Introduction”). Thus, countless in-
dividually imperceptible white-trope momentary events (“trope-atoms”) 
constitute visible white, and countless individually imperceptible desire-
trope-atoms constitute felt desire. Any phenomenon that reduces to 
trope-atoms is conventionally real, but whatever does not reduce is not 
conventionally real. With “I want more vanilla ice cream,” there are no I-
trope-atoms or ice-cream-trope-atoms, but presumably desire-trope-
atoms, sweetness-trope-atoms, and white-trope-atoms, and perhaps 
consciousness-trope-atoms. But saying “ice cream is an illusion but 
whiteness and sweetness are real” conjures the no-leather-shoes and the 
regular coffee objections.  
                                                             
59 Siderits thinks I’ve misunderstood his reasoning here because, on his reading, com-
mon sense denies that there can be the occurrence of whiteness without some thing—a 
substance—that is white. That, he adds, is also Candrakirti’s view of conventional 
truth—and so what Mādhyamaka implies. So even if I (using my gloss) take his words 
outside the Ābhidharma context that he’s formulated them within, I’ve missed the 
point. Siderits (personal communication, February 2012). I may be missing the point, 
but I doubt it is a given that common sense equates whiteness with substance, when 
students (who are not philosophy majors) discussing Descartes seem to know that red 
is a color and triangles are three-sided even if we are dreaming or in an illusory (insub-
stantial) world. Siderits also seems to evidence one of his glosses here, in implicitly 
equating common sense with conventionalese. Enlightened beings speak convention-
alese, but insofar as common sense may be described as the sum of all mankind’s preju-
dices, enlightened speakers of conventionalese do not possess common sense. 
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In their “Introduction” to A Comprehensive Manual of Abhi-
dhamma,60 the most extensive canonical account of Buddhist atomism, 
Dhamma and Bodhi state: 
Briefly, the dhamma theory maintains that ultimate reali-
ty consists of a multiplicity of elementary constituents 
called dhammas. The dhammas are not noumena hidden 
behind phenomena, not “things in themselves” as op-
posed to “mere appearances,” but the fundamental com-
ponents of actuality. The dhammas fall into two broad 
classes: the unconditioned dhamma, which is solely Nib-
bana, and the conditioned dhammas, which are the mo-
mentary mental and material phenomena that constitute 
the process of experience . . . . It is the dhammas alone 
that possess ultimate reality: determinate existence “from 
their own side” (sarupato) independent of the mind’s con-
ceptual processing of the data.61  
The general justification for their view is the Buddha’s claim to have di-
rectly perceived the dhammas with the penetrating insight of his en-
lightened mind, a claim confirmed by subsequent enlightened Buddhists 
and supported by meditative phenomenology, which reveals the ephem-
eral, pixel-like, micro-level nature of everything in the mind/body field 
that otherwise appears as a solid, permanent, macro-level object.  
Buddhist tropes are experientially homogeneous aggregates, like 
whiteness, that decompose into parts, down to indefinitely many micro-
                                                             
60 In the title, “Abhidhamma” is Pāli; “Ābhidharma” is Sanskrit. 
61 “Nibbana” (as they spell it, but technically, “nibbāna”) is Pāli for “nirvāṇa” (Sanskrit). 
In this context, it refers to emptiness. (Likewise, what they spell as “sarupato” is, tech-
nically, “sarūpato.”) Unconditioned dhamma, emptiness, is ultimately real for Ābhi-
dharmikas and on my gloss, but Ābhidharmikas include conditioned dhammas, momen-
tary phenomena, in ultimate reality; my gloss parses all conditioned phenomena, all 
form, as conventional, but also accepts that some conventional truths (their condi-
tioned dhammas) are also ultimately true. 
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level dhammas/trope-atoms. This appears reasonable initially; recall, 
however, that whatever can aggregate (even micro-tropes) has magni-
tude and is divisible. Only what lacks magnitude is indivisible, but noth-
ing lacking magnitude aggregates. Further, anything above the trope-
atomic level, such as my wanting ice cream, say, “mental state x,” already 
involves mereological fiction because there are no x-trope-atoms. For 
although some mental states (meditative trances) may be constituted by 
a homogeneous mass, say, of monadic/identical bliss-atoms, most mental 
states are constituted by a nonmonadic/heterogeneous variety of items 
only some of which seem composed of smaller quantities of identical at-
oms.  
Mental state x is heterogeneous and minimally dyadic: it involves 
wanting and ice cream wanted (not to mention whiteness and sweet-
ness). Siderits treats x as legitimate even though one of its parts, ice 
cream, does not exist (does not reduce to ice-cream-tropes) and though 
x is not made of x-tropes, perhaps because x’s parts—wanting, sweet-
ness, and whiteness, say, a, b, and c—reduce one-to-one to a-tropes, b-
tropes, and c-tropes, respectively. But why is similar legitimacy denied 
to person “p” even though there are no p-tropes that compose p, and p 
arguably reduces by a process similar to the one in which x does not re-
duce to x-tropes but nonetheless reduces to a-tropes, b-tropes, and c-
tropes? That is, p arguably equally reduces to a series of mental states, x, 
y, z, each of which in turn (like x) reduce to a-tropes, b-tropes, and so on. 
If mental (“M”) states are heterogeneous, they do not decompose into a 
mass of homogeneous M-trope atoms, so M-states are mereological fic-
tions. There can be few ultimate M-states, if any, on the mereological re-
duction model (such as all-bliss trance states), and fewer ultimate psy-
chological laws that govern them, because M-laws govern complexly 
nonmonadic causal relations between M-states.  
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 Siderits states, “The illusion of incompatibilism may arise . . . by 
smuggling the concept of a person into the ultimate level . . . or by im-
porting psychological determinism into our conventional talk of per-
sons” (“Beyond” 155-156). But “psychological determinism” is the thesis 
that mental-state events (“that correspond to . . . deliberating and will-
ing”) are determined. A generic principle of psychological determinism 
might be the practical syllogism rule:  
If agent A desires z and believes doing y will bring about z, 
then, ceteris paribus, A will do y.   
Laws of psychological determinism, if any, have this heterogeneous (tri-
adic, quadratic, or increasingly complex) form (involving agents, beliefs, 
desires, and actions), or something like it, so they too are mereological 
fictions. Therefore, contra paleo-compatibilism, psychological determin-
ism—not about micro-level trope-atomic homogeneous/monadic M-
states, but macro-level heterogeneous/nonmonadic M-states—cannot be 
ultimatese. Of course, the paleo-compatibilist can again appeal to the 
conventional/ultimate spectrum for wiggle room, but the more these 
appeals are made, the more support they provide for my Mahāyāna-
based emptiness/form gloss, if not indirect support for Siderits’s own 
(post-Reductionist) semantic nondualist synthesis (of Reductionism and 
antirealism). 
Thus, for mereological reductionists, psychological determinism 
involves mereological fiction and is ultimately false, even if true in some 
nonultimate (conventional) domain. Garfield’s omni-truth-levels model 
seems tailor-made to the conventional/ultimate (form/emptiness) spec-
trum, like Dennett’s, for it suggests that there are many level-
appropriate vocabulary/phenomena pairings and that all such pairing-
levels are valid, but without reductive eliminativism. As he puts it, “let a 
thousand entities bloom, requiring of each that it genuinely toil and 
spin, accomplishing some real explanatory work” (Garfield “Nāgārjuna” 
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512). If so, if they do explanatory work, responsible agents, M-states, 
their psychophysical constituents, and dhammas possess equal ontologi-
cal value.  
This line of reasoning is consistent with the sort of semantic 
nondualist view Siderits espouses as his own in Persons, which raises the 
question why Siderits has not simply offered the semantic nondualist 
view of free will. I cannot say, but I will speculate. In light of his explana-
tion of why he does take the role of amicus theoria for the Buddhist Re-
ductionist view (as an illustration of the philosophical potential of Bud-
dhism), I suspect the answer has to do with the popularity of reduction-
ism in the audience to which Siderits targets this illustration, namely, 
Western analytic philosophy. Another possibility is that as difficult as it 
is to grasp the meaning of Buddhist Reductionism, it is even more so 
with antirealism and semantic nondualism. Thus, perhaps it is wise to 
simply leave the matter so that any such interlocutors who are drawn in 
by the illustration may then go on to be drawn into the dialectical pro-
gression from Reductionism through antirealism to semantic nondual-
ism. This would effectuate a philosophical bait and switch, but Siderits is 
explicit in his amicus theoria disclaimers. All of this is, admittedly, specu-
lation. However, it bears repeating that it would be nice to hear Siderits’s 
own articulation of the semantic nondualist view of free will. 
 
Conclusion 
Let us conclude our assessment of Siderits’s amicus briefs on behalf of 
paleo-compatibilism. By applying Buddhist Reductionism to free will and 
determinism, paleo-compatibilism accommodates both libertarianism 
and determinism—two prima facie contradictory doctrines. Thus, paleo-
compatibilism warrants the classification “semi-compatibilist,” a term 
previously denoting only the view that determinism is “hard” because it 
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is incompatible with metaphysical-alternatives-accessing autonomy but 
“soft” because it is compatible with moral responsibility.62 But paleo-
compatibilism is difficult to comprehensively assess because it stacks a 
number of puzzling doctrines atop each other, and readers must exam-
ine Siderits’s other works to ascertain whether paleo-compatibilism is 
broadly coherent; arguably, it is not: to the extent his larger work in Per-
sons dialectically critiques and absorbs (paleo-compatibilism’s) Reduc-
tionism into its larger framework of semantic nondualism, that larger 
work suggests that paleo-compatibilism is not broadly coherent, though 
Siderits’s larger framework is. Taken as a stage within that larger 
framework, it is coherent.  
 Although paleo-compatibilism raises questions, and some of its 
details seem at odds with each other, many such discrepancies are func-
tions of external criticisms that shift focus between different nodes 
along the conventional/ultimate spectrum, rather than indications of 
internal inconsistencies in paleo-compatibilism. There is no doubt that 
elements of semantic dualism, mereological reductionism, and trope-
theory do appear in various forms of Buddhism, especially pre-Mahāyāna 
Buddhism. Their seeming incompatibility, likewise, may owe more to the 
complexity of Buddhism than to paleo-compatibilism per se. To his credit 
Siderits seeks to integrate them all under one theoretical umbrella that 
ought to earn the respect of Western philosophers. Nonetheless, compat-
ibilists and incompatibilists alike might consider paleo-compatibilism 
faux-compatibilism, for the generic reason they equally resist semi-
compatibilism despite its offer of an olive branch to both sides, and per-
haps also because the opacity of semantic insulation obscures the incon-
sistency between determinism and indeterminism—its cage compatible 
character.  
                                                             
62 See Fischer (Way). 
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 Those Western philosophers who do look to Buddhism for sup-
port have questions for paleo-compatibilism. How can determinism be 
ultimatese if all nomological relations are minimally dyadic and mo-
ments-spanning, which contradicts the Buddhist idea that momentari-
ness undermines the ultimate status of anything moments-spanning? 
How can there be ultimatese “moments” or “instants”—temporal atoms 
(indivisibles)—if anything with temporal magnitude is infinitely divisi-
ble? Ābhidharma posits indefinitely many dhammas per blink of an eye, 
but even if these somehow manage to transcend logic and actually be 
magnitude-lacking indivisibles that can nevertheless aggregate to form 
magnitude-possessing perceptible elements of experience, anything in-
volving more than one extremely small micro-moment—which is every-
thing we experience and know about—does not exist. Any claim about 
moments-spanning relations or causal processes—sufficient for any per-
ceivable iota—is ultimately unreal. The paleo-compatibilist reply is likely 
simple: this is correct, but do not forget the other part of the paleo-
compatibilist explanatory strategy, which is that all these things are 
conventionally real. And Siderits can always add that the full explana-
tion may be found in his semantic nondualism, where a thousand flowers 
bloom. 
 My analysis suggests that determinism and free will are both 
conventional, so both are robustly compatible (even if located at differ-
ent nodes along the conventional spectrum). But Sautrāntrikas think 
whatever has causal powers is ultimately real.63 Because natural kinds 
are defined by their causal powers, they must be ultimately real. Thus, 
laws about them, and generalizations about all laws (determinism), must 
be ultimatese as well. This “if causal, then ultimate” formulation sup-
ports the causal/counterfactual analysis of an agent-like process or per-
son-series that exhibits the sort of self-regulatory (causal) control over 
                                                             
63 Cozort and Preston (Buddhist 55).  
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itself (autonomy) depicted by satisfaction of some of our (arguably soft-
determinist-favoring) items 1-20 (particularly 9-11 and 14). But then 
both free will and determinism would be ultimatese and robustly com-
patible (in the sense of being true on the same bivalent scale), or both 
conventionalese and equally unproblematic. 
 All such objections notwithstanding, it is to Siderits’s credit that 
he sticks his neck out to plant fertile ground for humanists to try to sal-
vage free will in the ever-encroaching face of increasingly threatening 
determinism, by reference to paleo-compatibilism. No complete account 
of the Buddhist understanding of free will can ignore Siderits’s central 
contribution—the claim that paleo-compatibilism offers a philosophical-
ly rich way to understand the issue of free will and determinism—its un-
resolved implications notwithstanding. As Siderits himself insists, how-
ever, this is not necessarily “the” Buddhist view, “the” Ābhidharmika 
view, or “his” view. Rather, it is just “a” possible view that a Buddhist 
Reductionist might adopt in response to the freedom-determinism prob-
lematic. But in spelling out the many ways even one kind of Ābhi-
dharmika model might be developed to this end, Siderits has, undoubt-
edly, significantly raised the level of debate, for any other kind of Ābhi-
dharmika, Buddhist, or non-Buddhist.  
 Although early-period scholars sought to identify a middle-path 
between “rigid” hard determinist and “chaotic” indeterminist libertari-
an extremes, but failed to clearly articulate their positions, Siderits’s 
paleo-compatibilism seeks to salvage elements of both extremes by lo-
cating them on different levels of discourse one of which, the conven-
tional (in which persons exist and have free will), reduces to the other, 
the ultimate (in which there are no persons but only person-series that 
are entirely determined by impersonal causes). His particular reduction-
ism is mostly limited to pre-Mahāyāna Buddhism and thus it is perhaps 
unlikely to impress Mahāyānists, compatibilists, or incompatibilists 
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without further refinements. However, if those refinements develop 
(perhaps along traditional semi-compatibilist lines and those suggested 
by the dialectical progression in Persons), his strategy seems promising.  
 In the next article in this series, “Determinism”, I discuss how 
Charles Goodman embraces hard determinism, arguing that Buddhism 
rejects autonomous agency because it rejects agency or selfhood and be-
cause it rejects moral responsibility, which latter presupposes an auton-
omous self. Siderits and Goodman embrace hard determinism, but in 
radically different ways, reflecting different reactions to and interpreta-
tions of the anātman doctrine. In recent-period scholarship (Repetti “Re-
cent”), these divisions run more acutely along doctrinal lines, where 
scholars relying on Pāli sources mostly accept determinism, but scholars 
relying on Mahāyāna sources seem to embrace indeterminism. Both 
groups agree, however, that Buddhism is compatible with free will even 
in the absence of a real self, a position I call “soft compatibilism” to con-
trast with “hard incompatibilism,” the view that free will is incompatible 
with determinism and with indeterminism. In this sense, perhaps Sider-
its’s semi-compatibilism, in trying to accommodate both sides, is not on-
ly consistent with early-period attempts at a middle-path toward free 
will, but prescient. 
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